Nordic Wittgenstein Review Symposium on James R. Shaw’s Wittgenstein on Rules: Justification, Grammar, and Agreement
Open Review until 2025-11-06
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15845/nwr.v14.3783Keywords:
rule-following, skepticism, Kripke, S.Abstract
Nordic Wittgenstein Review Symposium on James R. Shaw’s Wittgenstein on Rules: Justification, Grammar, and Agreement. With contributions by James R. Shaw, Oskari Kuusela, Alex Miller, and Hannah Ginsborg.
References
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