Nordic Wittgenstein Review 2020-08-06T20:32:32+02:00 Simo Säätelä Open Journal Systems <p><strong><em>Nordic Wittgenstein Review</em> (NWR)</strong> publishes original contributions on all aspects of Wittgenstein's thought and work.&nbsp;Each issue includes a peer-reviewed articles section, an archival section, and a book review section. In addition, most issues include&nbsp;an invited paper and/or an interview. The journal is published by the <em>Nordic Wittgenstein Society</em> (NWS).</p> <p>eISSN 2242-248X</p> Note from the Editors and Prepublication Open Review Information 2020-04-15T12:55:20+02:00 Simo Säätelä Gisela Bengtsson Cato Wittusen Oskari Kuusela 2020-03-20T11:14:20+01:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## Wittgenstein’s Critique of the Additive Conception of Language 2020-08-06T20:32:32+02:00 James F. Conant <p>This paper argues that Wittgenstein, both early and late, rejects the idea that the logically simpler and more fundamental case is that of "the mere sign" and that what a meaningful symbol is can be explained through the elaboration of an appropriately supplemented conception of the sign: the sign plus something (say, an interpretation or an assignment of meaning). Rather the sign, in the logically fundamental case of its mode of occurrence, is an internal aspect of the symbol. The Tractatus puts this point as follows: “The sign is that in the symbol which is perceptible by the senses.” Conversely, this means that it is essential to a symbol – to what a symbol is – that it have an essentially perceptible aspect. For Wittgenstein there is no privileged direction of explanatory priority between symbol and sign here: without signs there are no symbols (hence without language there is no thought) and without some sort of relation to symbols there are no signs (hence the philosopher’s concept of the supposedly "merely linguistic" presupposes an internal relation to symbols).</p> 2020-03-23T00:00:00+01:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## Wittgenstein and G. H. von Wright’s path to The Varieties of Goodness (1963) 2020-08-06T20:32:31+02:00 Lassi Johannes Jakola <p>The development of G. H. von Wright’s work in ethics is traced from the early 1950s to the publication of <em>The Varieties of Goodness </em>in 1963, with special focus on the influences stemming from Wittgenstein’s later thought. In 1952, von Wright published an essay suggesting a formal analysis of the concept of value. This attempt was soon abandoned. The change of approach took place at the time von Wright started his work on Wittgenstein’s <em>Nachlass </em>and tried to articulate the main lines of Wittgenstein’s <em>Philosophische Untersuchungen</em> in spoken and written form. This preoccupation with Wittgenstein led to a new approach to <em>value judgments</em> in an 1954 article, which shows strong late-Wittgensteinian influences on methodical as well as stylistic levels. Some traces of the 1954 approach are still visible in <em>The Varieties of Goodness</em>, while the stylistic imitations and allusions have mostly been dropped. Furthermore, von Wright’s approach in <em>The Varieties </em>is wider in scope, aiming at a broad overview of the phenomenon von Wright calls the “varieties of goodness”. But new conncections to the later Wittgenstein also seem to emerge: the idea of a "perspicuous presentation" of ethical concepts and the will to make philosophy relevant for "kulturens större sammanhang".</p> 2020-04-15T17:20:02+02:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## Winds of Change: The Later Wittgenstein’s Conception of the Dynamics of Change 2020-08-06T20:32:30+02:00 Cecilie Eriksen <p>The theme of change is one of the most prominent traits of Wittgenstein’s later work, and his writings have inspired many contemporary thinkers’ discussions of changes in e.g. concepts, ‘aspect-seeing’, practices, worldviews, and forms of life. However, Wittgenstein’s conception of the dynamics of change has not been investigated in its own right.</p> <p>The aim of this paper is to investigate which understanding of the dynamics of changes can be found in the later Wittgenstein’s work. I will argue that what emerges is a rich and complex picture that has the potential to aid our thinking in politics and elsewhere when developing strategies for creating changes. It can do so both as source of inspiration and by countering tempting, yet ultimately problematic ways of conceptualizing change like the hope for transforming harmful traditions and social practices with the help of a general explanatory theory of the fundamental dynamics of changes.</p> 2020-06-03T00:00:00+02:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## Wittgenstein's Forms of Life: A Tool of Perspicuous Representation 2020-08-06T20:32:29+02:00 Olli Lagerspetz <p>The focus is on two texts by Wittgenstein where ‘forms of life’ constitute the pivot of an extended argument: ‘Cause and Effect’ and the discussion of colour concepts in ‘Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology’. The author argues that forms of life are above all Wittgenstein's response to the question what it is to analyse a concept. The remark that forms of life are ‘given’ and must be ‘accepted’ is a natural corollary of Wittgenstein’s antireductionism and his idea of philosophy as a descriptive enterprise. Wittgenstein is, however, not offering forms of life as the ultimate foundation of our statements about causation or colour. He shifts the focus to the questioning activity itself. Our inquiries and descriptions imply conceptions of how to look and what to accept as verification. Forms of life are given, not because they cannot be analysed further, but because the investigation will take them as given. Comparisons are made, on the one hand, with G.H. von Wright’s interventionist account of the concept of causation and, on the other hand, with the two currently dominant interpretations of ‘forms of life’: the ‘linguistic community’ view and the ‘naturalist’ view.</p> 2020-06-03T00:00:00+02:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## Chadbourne Gilpatric and Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Fateful Meeting 2020-08-06T20:32:31+02:00 Stephen Leach <p>On January 11 1951 Chadbourne Gilpatric met with Wittgenstein to offer him, on behalf of the Rockefeller Foundation, funding for any forthcoming publications. Wittgenstein politely declined the offer as he did not believe his health would permit him to bring any projects to completion. The meeting is referred to in a letter from Wittgenstein to Norman Malcolm and is also recalled by O.K. Bouwsma. Bouwsma learned of it from conversations with Wittgenstein and by Gilpatric. However, it is also recounted in Gilpatric’s diary. Gilpatric’s account comprises the fullest account of the meeting. It has remained unedited, until now, and is here transcribed for the first time. Five years later on February 1 1956 Gilpatric submitted a report, entitled ‘Logician and Mystic’, to the Rockefeller Foundation This report adds detail to his original account and summarises the Rockefeller’s financial support of the posthumous publication of Wittgenstein’s work. It also sketches Gilpatric’s view of Wittgenstein’s work.</p> <p><strong><a href="" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Open Review</a> until 2020-05-15</strong></p> 2020-04-15T17:19:30+02:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## Language, Ethics and "The Merits of Being Involved in Meaning". Review of Maria Balaska: Wittgenstein and Lacan at the Limit: Meaning and Astonishment 2020-08-06T20:32:29+02:00 Paul Livingston <p>Working through Balaska’s deeply perceptive, elegantly written, and profoundly honest book, <em>Wittgenstein and Lacan at the Limit</em>, a reader steeped in the recent academic literature about either or both of its main figures may come to feel herself placed at what is, itself, a certain kind of limit.&nbsp; The limit I mean is the limit of a familiar type of theoretical discourse about the constitution and structure of language and subjectivity as Wittgenstein and Lacan treat them: it includes the discourses that seek, for instance, to articulate how language and sense are constituted in the <em>Tractatus</em>, and thus what is really meant by “logical form” and “nonsense” there; or those that aim to comprehend the true relationship of our biological nature to language, culture, and the advent of freedom in Lacan; or, again, those that try to find, in either thinker’s works (or both), the precise location of the delicate logical buttonhole that would alone permit us entry, from within everyday language and life, to the absoluteness of an ineffable beyond. &nbsp;&nbsp;These discourses all treat of language and life, but handle these phenomena (so we might say) at arm’s length, theorizing the structure of each and the form of their relationship in such a way as to establish, ultimately, their mutual convertibility to one another, their mutual absorption into a third, more inclusive term (such as “nature” or “biology), or adduce translations from the dense theoretical matrices of one thinker’s treatment of them to the other’s (for instance, from the terminology of logic to that of psychoanalysis, or back again).&nbsp; Balaska’s book, doing none of these things, rather succeeds in bringing out how an interconnected reading of the Wittgenstein of the <em>Tractatus </em>and Lacan may speak to and inform our response to a certain kind of experience that is characteristic for both thinkers, and typical as well of those moments and occasions of our lives in which we may find ourselves drawn to reflect on what meaning is and how we relate to it.&nbsp;</p> 2020-06-03T00:00:00+02:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement##