Nordic Wittgenstein Review 2020-01-29T04:53:37+01:00 Simo Säätelä Open Journal Systems <p><strong><em>Nordic Wittgenstein Review</em> (NWR)</strong> publishes original contributions on all aspects of Wittgenstein's thought and work.&nbsp;Each issue includes a peer-reviewed articles section, an archival section, and a book review section. In addition, most issues include&nbsp;an invited paper and/or an interview. The journal is published by the <em>Nordic Wittgenstein Society</em> (NWS).</p> <p>eISSN 2242-248X</p> Note from the Editors 2020-01-29T04:53:25+01:00 Simo Säätelä Gisela Bengtsson Oskari Kuusela Cato Wittusen <p>An editorial note for NWR vol 8 no 1-2</p> 2019-12-19T00:00:00+01:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## In Memoriam Sören Stenlund (1943-2019) 2020-01-29T04:53:25+01:00 Sharon Rider <p>Obituary for Sören Stenlund</p> 2019-12-19T00:00:00+01:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## The Wittgenstein Lectures, Revisited 2020-01-29T04:53:28+01:00 James C. Klagge <p>In 2003 I published a survey of Wittgenstein’s lectures in <em>Public and Private Occasions.&nbsp; </em>Much has been learned about his lectures since then.&nbsp; This paper revisits the earlier survey and provides additional material and corrections, which amount to over 25%.&nbsp; In case it is useful, I have provided interlinear pagination from the original publication.</p> 2019-12-19T00:00:00+01:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## On Wittgenstein, Radical Pluralism, and Radical Relativity 2020-01-29T04:53:37+01:00 Randy Ramal <p>In this paper, I introduce the idea of ‘radical relativity’ to elucidate an undervalued justificatory context for Wittgenstein’s affirmation of radical pluralism. I accept D.Z. Phillips’s definition of radical pluralism as the view that certain radical differences between people’s ordinary practices prevent the latter from being reduced to a necessary set of common interests, meanings, or truths. I argue that radical relativity provides this form of pluralism with the logical justification it requires in that it accounts for how pluralism became radical. More specifically, I argue that the contingent, non-causal, and yet non-arbitrary relation between ordinary concepts and the pluralistic world through which they emerge explains the reality of radical pluralism. Radical relativity is suggested in Wittgenstein’s three notions of ‘concept formation’, ‘agreement in reaction’, and ‘world pictures’, I argue, without endorsing traditional forms of relativism. Finally, I show that although D.Z. Phillips and Hilary Putnam promote notions of pluralism indebted to Wittgenstein, neither philosopher utilizes the radical relativity suggested in his work to justify his respective version of pluralism or Wittgenstein’s version of radical pluralism.</p> 2019-03-14T00:00:00+01:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## "Meaning is a Physiognomy": Wittgenstein on Seeing Words and Faces 2020-01-29T04:53:36+01:00 Carolina Scotto <p>The second part of <em>Philosophical Investigations</em> and other contemporary writings contain abundant material dedicated to the examination of visual perception, along the lines of similarities and differences manifested in the use of concepts such as “seeing as”, “seeing aspects”, “noticing the aspect”, “aspect blindness”, among other, related ones. However, the application of these concepts to phenomena such as face perception and word perception has not received proper attention in the literature. Our interest lies in identifying the features pertaining facial perception and recognition of its content in order to understand how and to what extent they contribute to shed light on perceptual (and experiential) relationships we have with language, in particular with its written form. In other words, we will try to show in what ways the “phenomenology of facial perception” or “physiognomy” helps to understand the “experience of meaning” and the “phenomenology of reading”. My interpretative hypothesis is that, in Wittgenstein’s view, the features shared by face and word perception are more profound than a mere analogy, and that, in the case of words, these features can explain specific semantic (perhaps, semantic-pragmatic) phenomena that should be included in an appropriate reconstruction of the varieties of use in natural languages.&nbsp;</p> 2019-03-14T00:00:00+01:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## Sraffa, Hume, and Wittgenstein’s Lectures On Belief 2020-01-29T04:53:35+01:00 Lucia Morra <p>As the recent edition of the <em>Wittgenstein’s Whewell’s Court Lectures</em> shows, Wittgenstein mentioned Hume several times in the series of lectures on belief. Towards the end of the Thirties, in fact, he came across Hume’s <em>Abstract</em> of the<em> Treatise</em>, a pamphlet that Piero Sraffa and John Maynard Keynes had ‘discovered’ at the end of 1933, re-edited in 1937 and finally published in March 1938 – Sraffa, with whom Wittgenstein had an intense intercourse in 1938-1941, donated him a copy. A lexical analysis of excerpts of Wittgenstein’s ET 1940 lectures strongly suggests that he read the <em>Abstract</em> in March-May 1940, and shows that some of the issues he discussed in his lectures at that time revolve around the peculiar definition that Hume gave in that text of the feeling of belief.</p> 2019-05-14T00:00:00+02:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## On Redrawing the Force-Content Distinction 2020-01-29T04:53:30+01:00 Christian Georg Martin <p>Frege distinguished the thought qua logical <em>content</em> from the assertoric <em>force</em> attached to it when judged to be true. The gist of this distinction is captured by the so-called Frege-Geach point. Recently, several authors have drawn inspiration from Wittgenstein to reject this point and the distinction it is based on. This article proceeds from the observation that Wittgenstein himself did not reject the force-content distinction but urged us to reformulate it in a non-dualistic way. While drawing on Wittgensteinian lessons about thought and its expression, the overall purpose of this paper is systematic, not exegetic: it seeks to contribute to the contemporary debate aboute force and content by arguing that this distinction should be <em>redrawn</em> in such a way as to exhibit force as internal to thought, namely, as that which provides for the unity of thought. To this end, it is investigated what it is for a thought to occur as a forceless part of a propositionally complex assertion (e. g. for <em>p</em> to occur as a part of the assertion that <em>not p</em>).</p> 2019-12-19T00:00:00+01:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## Wittgenstein to Sraffa: Two Newly-discovered Letters from February and March 1934 2020-01-29T04:53:35+01:00 Moira De Iaco <p>This paper introduces and publishes two letters from 1934 written by Wittgenstein to Sraffa. The first of these confirms that on the one hand Wittgenstein and Sraffa had communicative difficulties. &nbsp;On the other hand Wittgenstein acknowledged the strength of Sraffa’s thinking and he was aware of being positively influenced by it. The second longer letter is part of a debate between Wittgenstein and Sraffa that had been ongoing in the few weeks preceding the letter. In the letter, Wittgenstein tried to clarify and review in part his thinking on the points he discussed during the debate.</p> 2019-03-14T00:00:00+01:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## “Ludwig Wittgenstein” – A BBC Radio Talk by Elizabeth Anscombe in May 1953 2020-01-29T04:53:26+01:00 Christian Erbacher Anne dos Santos Reis Julia Jung <p>Presented here is the transcript of a BBC radio broadcast by Elizabeth Anscombe that was recorded in May 1953 – the month when Wittgenstein’s <em>Philosophical Investigations</em> appeared in England for the first time. In her radio talk, Anscombe provides some biographical and philosophical background for reading the <em>Philosophical Investigations</em>. She addresses the importance of the <em>Tractatus</em> and of the literary qualities of Wittgenstein’s writing. Anscombe warns that it would be fruitless to adopt slogans from Wittgenstein without insight. She also calls it a misunderstanding to think that Wittgenstein had championed something like the Ordinary Language Philosophy as it was practised at the time of the recording.</p> 2019-12-19T00:00:00+01:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## Understanding Wittgenstein, Understanding Modernism, ed. Anat Matar 2020-01-29T04:53:28+01:00 Lars Hertzberg <p>Review&nbsp; of&nbsp; Anat Matar, ed., <em>Understanding Wittgenstein, Understanding Modernism. </em>New York et al: Bloomsbury, 2017, ISBN: HB: 978-1-5013-0243-5, xv+270 pp.</p> 2019-12-19T00:00:00+01:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## New Critical Thinking: What Wittgenstein Offered, by Sean Wilson 2020-01-29T04:53:27+01:00 Camilla Kronqvist 2019-12-19T00:00:00+01:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## A Film-Philosophy of Ecology and Enlightenment, by Rupert Read 2020-01-29T04:53:27+01:00 Mio Lindman 2019-12-19T00:00:00+01:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## Wittgenstein on Logic as the Method of Philosophy: Re-examining the Roots and Development of Analytic Philosophy, by Oskari Kuusela 2020-01-29T04:53:29+01:00 Jakub Mácha <p>Review of&nbsp;Kuusela, Oskari. <em>Wittgenstein on Logic as the Method of Philosophy: Re-examining the Roots and Development of Analytic Philosophy</em>.&nbsp;Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.</p> 2019-12-19T00:00:00+01:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement##