https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/issue/feed Nordic Wittgenstein Review 2019-05-21T20:54:51+02:00 Simo Säätelä simo.saatela@uib.no Open Journal Systems <p><strong><em>Nordic Wittgenstein Review</em> (NWR)</strong> publishes original contributions on all aspects of Wittgenstein's thought and work.&nbsp;Each issue includes a peer-reviewed articles section, an archival section, and a book review section. In addition, most issues include&nbsp;an invited paper and/or an interview. The journal is published by the Nordic Wittgenstein Society (NWS).</p> <p>eISSN 2242-248X</p> https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3524 Note from the Editors 2019-05-21T20:54:45+02:00 Simo Säätelä simo.saatela@uib.no Gisela Bengtsson gisela.bengtsson@filosofi.uu.se Tove Österman tove.osterman@filosofi.uu.se 2018-12-20T00:00:00+01:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3521 Stanley Cavell’s Argument of the Ordinary 2019-05-21T20:54:48+02:00 Avner Baz avner.baz@tufts.edu <p>My overall aim is to show that there is a serious and compelling argument in Stanley Cavell’s work for why any philosophical theorizing that fails to recognize what Cavell refers to as “our common world of background” as a condition for the sense of anything we say or do, and to acknowledge its own dependence on that background and the vulnerability implied by that dependence, runs the risk of rendering itself, thereby, ultimately unintelligible. I begin with a characterization of Cavell’s unique way of inheriting Austin and Wittgenstein – I call it “ordinary language philosophy existentialism” – as it relates to what Cavell calls “skepticism”. I then turn to Cavell’s response to Kripke in “The Argument of the Ordinary”, which is different from all other responses to Kripke’s <em>Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language</em> in that Cavell’s response, while <em>theoretically</em> powerful, is at the same time also <em>existentialist</em>, in the sense that Cavell finds a way of <em>acknowledging in his writing</em> the fundamental fact that his writing (thinking) constitutes an <em>instance </em>of what he is writing (thinking) about. This unique achievement of Cavell’s response to Kripke is not <em>additional </em>to his argument, but <em>essential</em> to it: it enables him not merely to say, but to <em>show </em>that, and how, Kripke’s account falsifies what it purports to elucidate, and thereby to show that the theoretical question of linguistic sense is not truly separable, not even theoretically, from the broadly ethical question of how we relate to others, and how we conduct ourselves in relation to them from one moment to the next.</p> 2018-12-20T00:00:00+01:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3466 "Give Me an Example": Peter Winch and Learning from the Particular 2019-05-21T20:54:51+02:00 Ondřej Beran ondrej.beran@upce.cz <p>The text deals with the role of particular examples in our understanding, especially in the encounters with unfamiliar cases that may require us to expand our concepts. I try to show that Peter Winch’s reflections on the nature of understanding can provide the foundations for such an account. Understanding consists in a response informed by a background network of particular canonical examples. It is against this background that the distinction between appropriate differentiated reactions and misplaced ones makes sense. To accommodate applications of known concepts (such as love, or humour) to unfamiliar cases, particular examples are needed that invite the recipient in a certain direction of understanding, while providing a “closure” against arbitrary mis- or re-interpretations. This capacity has to do with a capacity or incapacity to convey the sense of seriousness of an example dealing with the <em>lives</em> of the persons (or characters) concerned.</p> 2018-12-20T00:00:00+01:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3512 Social Criticism, Moral Reasoning and the Literary Form 2019-05-21T20:54:50+02:00 Leonidas Tsilipakos l.tsilipakos@bristol.ac.uk <p>Widely chosen by students of society as an approach under which to labour, emancipatory, liberatory or, otherwise put, critical social thought occupies a position between knowledge and practical action whose coherence is taken for granted on account of the pressing nature of the issues it attempts to deal with. As such it is rarely subjected to scrutiny and the methodological, conceptual and moral challenges it faces are not properly identified. The contribution of this article is to raise these problems into view clearly and unambiguously. This is undertaken via a careful examination of Alice Crary’s recent work, in which she attempts, firstly, to defend a left-Hegelian version of Critical Theory by relating it to the work of Peter Winch and, second, to issue a set of methodologically radical recommendations on employing the sensibility-shaping powers of the literary form. The article aims to deepen our understanding of the fundamental tensions between the Critical Theory and Wittgensteinian traditions, which Crary attempts to bring together and, ultimately, of those crucial features of our moral practices that frustrate the enterprise of critical social thought.</p> 2018-12-20T00:00:00+01:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3522 Inheriting Wittgenstein: James Conant in Conversation with Niklas Forsberg, Part 2 2019-05-21T20:54:46+02:00 Niklas Forsberg niklas.forsberg@filosofi.uu.se James Conant jconant@uchicago.edu <p>This is part 2 of an interview with Prof. J. Conant, conducted by Niklas Forsberg.</p> 2018-12-20T00:00:00+01:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3518 Wittgenstein on British Anti-Nazi Propaganda 2019-05-21T20:54:49+02:00 Nuno Venturinha nventurinha.ifl@fcsh.unl.pt Jonathan Smith Jonathan.Smith@trin.cam.ac.uk <p>This paper contains a historical introduction and an edition of a hitherto unpublished manuscript of Wittgenstein's that was found among G. H. von Wright's materials kept in Helsinki. The document concentrates on British anti-Nazi propaganda and was written in 1945. Wittgenstein's criticism of this kind of propaganda, such as that promoted by Robert Vansittart, is also present in other sources of this period belonging to both the&nbsp;<em>Nachlass&nbsp;</em>and the correspondence.</p> 2018-12-20T00:00:00+01:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3517 Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Nachlass in the UNESCO Memory of the World register 2019-05-21T20:54:50+02:00 Alfred Schmidt alfred.schmidt@onb.ac.at <p>The contribution reports the inclusion of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s <em>Nachlass</em> into the UNESCO Memory of the World register.</p> 2018-12-20T00:00:00+01:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3519 Review of "Wittgenstein and Modernism" edited by Michael LeMahieu and Karen Zumhagen-Yekplé 2019-05-21T20:54:48+02:00 Olli Lagerspetz olagersp@abo.fi <p>Review of <em>Wittgenstein and Modernism&nbsp;</em>edited by Michael LeMahieu and Karen Zumhagen-Yekplé.</p> 2018-12-20T00:00:00+01:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3520 Review of "Becoming Who We Are: Politics and Practical Philosophy in the Work of Stanley Cavell" by Andrew Norris 2019-05-21T20:54:51+02:00 Eric Joseph Ritter eric.j.ritter@vanderbilt.edu <p>Review of <em>Becoming Who We Are: Politics and Practical Philosophy in the Work of Stanley Cavell</em>&nbsp;by Andrew Norris.</p> 2018-12-12T00:00:00+01:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement##