Nordic Wittgenstein Review
https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/
<p><strong><em>Nordic Wittgenstein Review</em> (NWR)</strong> publishes original contributions on all aspects of Wittgenstein's thought and work. Each issue includes a peer-reviewed articles section, an archival section, and a book review section. In addition, most issues include an invited paper and/or an interview. The journal is published by the <em>Nordic Wittgenstein Society</em> (NWS).</p> <p>eISSN 2242-248X</p>Nordic Wittgenstein Society (NWS)en-USNordic Wittgenstein Review2194-6825<div> <p>NWR uses the Creative Commons license CC-BY.</p> <p>Vol. 1-3 used CC-BY-NC-SA. The collected works copyright ownership for Vol. 1-2 were shared by Nordic Wittgenstein Society and ontos Verlag/De Gruyter.</p> <p> </p> </div>Showing, Not Saying, Negation and Falsehood: Establishing Kimhi’s Two-Way Logical Capacities with Wittgenstein’s Samples
https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3645
<p>Irad Kimhi has argued that negation and falsehood can be made intelligible by understanding assertions/judgements as acts of two-way logical capacities. These are capacities that are, at the same time, for (1) positive and negative assertions/judgements and (2) positive and negative facts. Kimhi’s account of negation and falsehood, however, faces several problems. As Jean-Philippe Narboux has shown, it is threatened with incompleteness or inconsistency in its employment of negative ostensible assertions that are not acts of two-way logical capacities, and, as I demonstrate in this article, it does not explain the assumed logical connections between two-way logical capacities or the acknowledged differences between acts of two-way logical capacities in the world and in assertion/judgement. I argue that these problems can be avoided and that a new understanding of the negation and falsehood of predicative assertion/judgement can be achieved by, first, regarding two-way logical capacities for predicative assertion/judgement and facts as established by our treating things as what Ludwig Wittgenstein calls “samples”, and, second, drawing a distinction between predicative assertions/judgements and normative assertions/judgements that, e.g., introduce samples into our language-games and show the rules for using samples for the purpose of representation.</p>Thomas Henry Raysmith
Copyright (c) 2023 Thomas Henry Raysmith
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2023-10-222023-10-22345310.15845/nwr.v12.3645"The Fitting Word"
https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3616
<p>In his post-war writings, Wittgenstein makes several comments on particularly “fitting” (<em>treffende</em>) words. However, the nature of this quality remains unclear and elusive. In this paper, I present some suggestions about what one might learn from Wittgenstein’s comments, though my purpose is not primarily exegetical, but rather simply to reflect upon what makes a word “fitting”. I discuss several options; first that it is the context what makes the word fitting, then that it is an “imponderable” quality it has. Eventually, I opt for the explanation that the fittingness has (at least often) to do with the enthusiastic feeling the word can give rise to. The feeling should not be construed as a mental event of a private kind, though; rather, we can describe in these terms the dynamics of conversational situations that feature “fitting” words.</p>Ondřej Beran
Copyright (c) 2023 Ondřej Beran
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2023-04-272023-04-2710.15845/nwr.v12.3616Wittgenstein and Stenlund on Mathematical Symbolism
https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3642
<p>In recent work, Sören Stenlund (2015) contextualizes Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics as aligned with the tradition of symbolic mathematics. In the early modern era, mathematicians began using purely formal methods disconnected from any obvious empirical applications, transforming their subject into a symbolic discipline. With this, Stenlund argues, they were freeing themselves of ancient ontological presuppositions and discovering the ultimately autonomous nature of mathematical symbolism, which eventually formed the basis for Wittgenstein’s thinking. A crucial premise of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics, on this view, is that the development of mathematical concepts is independent of any ontological implications and occurs in principle without normative connections to empirical applicability. This paper critically examines this narrative and arrives at the conclusion that Stenlund’s view of mathematical progress is in stark contrast to the later Wittgenstein’s writing, which emphasizes links between symbolisms and their applications.</p>Martin Gullvåg Sætre
Copyright (c) 2023 Martin Gullvåg Sætre
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2023-09-212023-09-2110.15845/nwr.v12.3642Book Review: Rupert Read, Wittgenstein's Liberatory Philosophy: Thinking Through His Philosophical Investigations
https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3662
João Esteves da Silva
Copyright (c) 2023 João Esteves da Silva
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2023-10-222023-10-2210.15845/nwr.v12.3662Alfred Schmidt, »I think of you constantly with love …«: Briefwechsel Ludwig Wittgenstein – Ben Richards 1946–1951
https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3693
Alois Pichler
Copyright (c) 2023 Alois Pichler
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2023-10-222023-10-2210.15845/nwr.v12.3693Essay Review: Cora Diamond on Ethics (edited by Maria Balaska)
https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3644
<p>Essay <span style="font-size: 0.875rem;">Review: </span><span style="font-size: 0.875rem;"> Cora Diamond on Ethics (ed. Maria Balaska)</span></p>Amadeusz Just
Copyright (c) 2023 Amadeusz Just
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2023-09-132023-09-1310.15845/nwr.v12.3644Cecilie Eriksen, Moral Change: Dynamics, Structure, and Normativity
https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3653
Ryan Manhire
Copyright (c) 2023 Ryan Manhire
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2023-04-272023-04-2710.15845/nwr.v12.3653Peter Winch, Spinoza on Ethics and Understanding
https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3656
<p>Review of Peter Winch, Spinoza on Ethics and Understanding.</p>Lars HertzbergWolfgang Kienzler
Copyright (c) 2023 Lars Hertzberg, Wolfgang Kienzler
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2023-09-112023-09-1110.15845/nwr.v12.3656Ludwig Wittgenstein: Dictating Philosophy. To Francis Skinner – The Wittgenstein-Skinner Manuscripts by Arthur Gibson and Niamh O’Mahony
https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3657
Wolfgang Kienzler
Copyright (c) 2023 Wolfgang Kienzler
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2023-09-032023-09-0310.15845/nwr.v12.3657Nancy Yousef, The Aesthetic Commonplace: Wordsworth, Eliot, Wittgenstein and the Language of Every Day
https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3667
Richard Eldridge
Copyright (c) 2023 Richard Eldridge
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2023-09-112023-09-1110.15845/nwr.v12.3667Ethics After Wittgenstein: Contemplation and Critique (edited by Richard Amesbury and Hartmut von Sass)
https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3658
Oskari Kuusela
Copyright (c) 2023 Oskari Kuusela
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2023-09-212023-09-2110.15845/nwr.v12.3658Maria Kokoszyńska-Lutmanowa about Wittgenstein in Cambridge (1978)
https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3665
<p>Maria Kokoszyńska-Lutmanowa (1906-1981) was a Polish philosopher and student of Kazimierz Twardowski, the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School. In 1938 she went to the University of Cambridge (Newnham College) on a Sarah Smitton Fellowship. There she attended George Edward Moore’s lectures as well as one of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s <em>Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics</em> in 1939. In this interview which was conducted with Alois Eder she talks about her encounter with Wittgenstein. It was published in 1978 in the Polish art and culture magazine <em>Odra</em> and is her only published memoir about Wittgenstein. The interview is republished here both in English translation and as facsimile of the original publication with the kind permission of the <em>Odra</em> magazine.</p>Piotr DehnelCarl HumphriesTomasz Zarębski
Copyright (c) 2023 Odra
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2023-04-272023-04-2710.15845/nwr.v12.3665Wittgenstein and Anscombe’s Intention
https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3683
<p class="NWRabstractbio"><span lang="EN-GB">Rachael Wiseman has argued that we cannot make sense of G.E.M. Anscombe’s <em>Intention</em> unless we recognise that it is an “exemplification of [Wittgenstein’s] grammatical investigation”. While Wiseman is alive to the Wittgensteinian nature of Anscombe’s method, and to her deep Wittgensteinian sympathies, she is not preoccupied with the question of influence. This is the question I am concerned with in the current paper. I argue that in focusing on the concept of intention, Anscombe was homing in on a pivotal concept in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, and that most of the basic elements of her account were being worked out by Wittgenstein during the period when she was his pupil. However, as Anscombe worked through Wittgenstein’s idea’s afresh, in her own more systematic and analytic mode of philosophical investigation, she often cast ideas that were sometimes merely nascent in Wittgenstein’s work in a new light. Moreover, some of her most seminal ideas had their origin in concerns which she did not share with Wittgenstein and were entirely original to her.</span></p>Marie McGinn
Copyright (c) 2023 Marie McGinn
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2023-11-212023-11-2173310.15845/nwr.v12.3683Note from the Editors and Open Review Information (Volume 12)
https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3684
<p>Editorial, Vol. 12</p>Simo SääteläGisela BengtssonOskari KuuselaCato Wittusen
Copyright (c) 2023 Simo Säätelä; Gisela Bengtsson, Oskari Kuusela, Cato Wittusen
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2023-04-272023-04-2750 Years After Wittgenstein’s Vienna. On Wittgenstein, Toulmin and Philosophy. Tomasz Zarębski in Conversation With Allan Janik
https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3700
<p>In this interview, Tomasz Zarębski speaks with Allan Janik, co-author of <em>Wittgenstein’s Vienna</em> (1973, with Stephen Toulmin), on the occasion of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the publication of this pathbreaking book. The conversation concerns the circumstances, motivations and reasons for his undertaking the work on the book, as well as its reception and place in Wittgenstein scholarship. A large part of the discussion refers to his perspective of Wittgenstein, Toulmin’s philosophical writings, and Janik’s own vision of philosophy. The interview took place in Innsbruck on 23<sup>rd</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> August 2023.</p>Tomasz ZarębskiAllan Janik
Copyright (c) 2023 Tomasz Zarębski, Allan Janik
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2023-12-292023-12-2910.15845/nwr.v12.3700