Showing, Not Saying, Negation and Falsehood: Establishing Kimhi’s Two-Way Logical Capacities with Wittgenstein’s Samples
Open Review until 2023-11-19
Keywords:Negation, Falsehood, Facts, Samples, Logical Capacities, Irad Kimhi, Wittgenstein
Irad Kimhi has argued that negation and falsehood can be made intelligible by understanding assertions/judgements as acts of two-way logical capacities. These are capacities that are, at the same time, for (1) positive and negative assertions/judgements and (2) positive and negative facts. Kimhi’s account of negation and falsehood, however, faces several problems. As Jean-Philippe Narboux has shown, it is threatened with incompleteness or inconsistency in its employment of negative ostensible assertions that are not acts of two-way logical capacities, and, as I demonstrate in this article, it does not explain the assumed logical connections between two-way logical capacities or the acknowledged differences between acts of two-way logical capacities in the world and in assertion/judgement. I argue that these problems can be avoided and that a new understanding of the negation and falsehood of predicative assertion/judgement can be achieved by, first, regarding two-way logical capacities for predicative assertion/judgement and facts as established by our treating things as what Ludwig Wittgenstein calls “samples”, and, second, drawing a distinction between predicative assertions/judgements and normative assertions/judgements that, e.g., introduce samples into our language-games and show the rules for using samples for the purpose of representation.
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