Numbers in Elementary Propositions: Some remarks on writings before and after Some Remarks on Logical Form

Anderson Luis Nakano

doi:10.15845/nwr.v6i1.3438

Authors

Anderson Luis Nakano University of São Paulo

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15845/nwr.v6i1.3438

Keywords:

Some Remarks on Logical Form, Wittgenstein, SRLF, logical analysis

Abstract

It is often held that Wittgenstein had to introduce numbers in elementary propositions due to problems related to the so-called colour-exclusion problem. I argue in this paper that he had other reasons for introducing them, reasons that arise from an investigation of the continuity of visual space and what Wittgenstein refers to as ‘intensional infinity’. In addition, I argue that the introduction of numbers by this route was prior to introducing them via the colour-exclusion problem. To conclude, I discuss two problems that Wittgenstein faced in the writings before Some Remarks on Logical Form (1929), problems that are independent of the colour-exclusion problem but dependent on the introduction of numbers in elementary propositions.

Author Biography

Anderson Luis Nakano, University of São Paulo

Anderson Luis Nakano is currently a postdoctoral researcher at the University of São Paulo. He completed a PhD with a thesis on Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics in the Philosophische Bemerkungen (Federal University of São Carlos, 2015). He also holds a Master’s degree in Computer Science from the University of São Paulo. His research focuses on Wittgenstein’s work and philosophy of mathematics, however his interests also include logic, computability and philosophy of language.

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