Remarks on Perception and Other Minds

Main Article Content

Edmund Dain

Abstract

It is a simple truth about the English language that we can see or hear or feel what others are thinking or feeling. But it is tempting to think that there is a deeper sense in which we cannot really see or hear or feel these things at all. Rather, what is involved must be a matter of inference or interpretation, for instance. In these remarks, I argue against a variety of ways in which that thought, the thought that we cannot really see or hear or feel what others are thinking or feeling, might be developed.

Section
Articles
Author Biography

Edmund Dain, Providence College

Edmund Dain is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Providence College. He has also taught at the University of Chicago and at Cardiff University, and held a Leiv Eiriksson visiting research fellowship at the University of Bergen. His research focuses on interpreting and applying the insights of Wittgenstein’s philosophy in connection with contemporary problems in ethics, philosophy of language and philosophy of mind.

References

Armstrong, D., 1980. The Nature of Mind and Other Essays. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
Austin, J. L., 1946. “Other Minds”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 20, pp. 148–187.
Cassam, Q., 2007. The Possibility of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dain, E., forthcoming. “An Attitude towards a Soul: Wittgenstein, Other Minds and the Mind”. In: T. Wallgren et al, eds. A Science of the Soul?
Dretske, F., 1973. “Perception and Other Minds”. Nous 7 (1), pp. 34–44.
Dretske, F., 2000a. “Simple Seeing”. In: F. Dretske, Perception, Knowledge and Belief. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 97–112.
Dretske, F., 2000b. “Conscious Experience”. In: F. Dretske, Perception, Knowledge and Belief. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 113–137.
Goldman, A., 2012. “Theory of Mind”. In: E. Margolis, R. Samuels and S. Stich, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 402–424.
McDowell, J., 2001. “On ‘The Reality of the Past’”. In: J. McDowell, Mind, Knowledge and Reality. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, pp. 295–313.
Overgaard, S., 2017. “The unobservability thesis”. Synthese 194 (3), pp. 743–60.
Russell, B., 1948. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Varga, S., 2017. “The case for mind perception”. Synthese 194 (3), pp. 787–807.
Wittgenstein, L., 1958. Philosophical Investigations. 3rd ed., G. E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, eds., trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L., 1969. On Certainty. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, eds., trans. by D. Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L., 1970. Zettel. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, eds., trans by G. E. M. Anscombe. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Wittgenstein, L., 1988. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I. G.E.M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, eds., transl. by G. E. M. Anscombe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wittgenstein, L., 1990. Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I. G.H. von Wright and H. Nyman, eds. trans. by C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wittgenstein, L., 1993. Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume II. G.H. von Wright and H. Nyman, eds., trans. by C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue. Oxford: Blackwell.