Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as

Main Article Content

Daniel Enrique Kalpokas

Abstract

According to Rorty, Davidson and Brandom, to have an experience is to be caused by our senses to hold a perceptual belief. This article argues that the phenomenon of seeing-as cannot be explained by such a conception of perceptual experience. First, the notion of experience defended by the aforementioned authors is reconstructed. Second, the main features of what Wittgenstein called “seeing aspects” are briefly presented. Finally, several arguments are developed in order to support the main thesis of the article: seeing-as cannot be explained by the conception of experience defended by Rorty, Davidson and Brandom.

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Articles
Author Biography

Daniel Enrique Kalpokas, National University of Cordoba. National Council of Scientific and Technical Research, Argentina (CONICET)

Daniel Enrique Kalpokas is Associate Professor of Philosophy at National University of Cordoba and Independent Researcher at National Council of Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET). He is the author of Richard Rorty and the Pragmatist Overcoming of Epistemology (2005). He has published papers on pragmatism, ethics, epistemology and philosophy of mind. His current research is focused on the nature of perceptual content.

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