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Thinking about Naturalism and Pragmatism: Wittgenstein, Rorty and Price

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Abstract

My paper is about the contrasting views of philosophy of Rorty and Wittgenstein. Rorty takes himself to be a kind of pragmatist. He understands the aim of philosophy to be that of changing our social practices, enabling us to cope better with our environment, to find more useful ways of speaking and to discard those that turn out to be unhelpful. Rorty also takes himself to be a kind of naturalist. His form of naturalism is close to that of Huw Price. Their sort of naturalism is concerned with the function in our lives of the terms and concepts and forms of discourse we use. As is explicit in Price's work, this kind of naturalism involves a kind of external theoretical stance in relation to our forms of thought. My paper contrasts their approach with Wittgenstein's understanding of philosophy and what he thought it could accomplish. Rorty explicitly contrasts Wittgenstein's clarificatory aims with what he takes philosophy to aim for; and I tie that contrast to their contrasting understanding of naturalism.

Introduction

I am going to look at the relation between Wittgenstein's thought and that of Rorty. I will also be looking at some of the ideas of Huw Price, a philosopher who has been influenced by Wittgenstein and Rorty. The first half of my essay is on Rorty and partly on Price as well, and the second half gets to Wittgenstein.

I start off with some remarks of Rorty's. The first three are among the many remarks in which Rorty speaks about *us pragmatists*, and the last is about what he is up to in such remarks:

> We pragmatists drop the appearance-reality distinction in favor of a distinction between beliefs which serve some purposes and beliefs which serve other purposes... (Rorty 1998a: 206)

> We pragmatists argue from the fact that the emergence of the human rights culture seems to owe nothing to increased human knowledge, and everything to hearing sad and sentimental stories, to the conclusion that there is no knowledge of the sort Plato envisaged. (Rorty 1998b: 172)
>
> [W]e pragmatists do not have a theory of truth. (Rorty 1987: 42)
>
> When I use the phrase [...] to which my critics object – "we pragmatists" – I am implicitly saying: try, for the nonce, ignoring the differences between Putnam and Peirce, Nietzsche and James, Davidson and Dewey, Sellars and Wittgenstein. Focus on the following similarities, and then other similarities may leap out at you. To grasp my nonce, idiosyncratic, sense of 'pragmatist', forget Sellars on picturing, Dewey on scientific method, Wittgenstein on nonsense, and Nietzsche on big strong warriors. Bracket these and other doctrines that strike me as wrong, or parochial, or tangential, and repackage what is left. The sort of repackaging job which such nonce usages permit seems to be an important element in the construction of narratives.[1] (Rorty 1995: 69).

Rorty often includes Wittgenstein as one of "us pragmatists". Wittgenstein counts for Rorty as one of the heroes of pragmatism, alongside Rorty's other heroes, like Dewey and Davidson and William James and Sellars. But you can also see in the fourth quotation what Rorty is doing when he talks about what *we pragmatists* believe. He is *packaging* his heroes, making them part of the philosophical story he is telling, and he is therefore leaving out elements in their thought that don't fit the story he is telling. I will be concerned first with a central element in the story.

1. Rorty and Pragmatism as Anti-Representationalism

In the fourth quotation, Rorty asks us to ignore or forget some of the things that the people he admires do actually say – the things that don't belong in the Rortyan narrative. – Here we should see that the narratives that Rorty is constructing have two parts: they are not narratives just about *us pragmatists* but are also about those philosophers who are not us – like Plato or Descartes or Tom Nagel. A Rortyan narrative is constructed by suggesting that there are significant similarities shared by "us pragmatists", and also significant

[1] The quotation contains "the following similarities". The similarities meant are whichever ones are indicated in this or that particular context by what Rorty puts after "we pragmatists think that" or some similar phrase. The use of the word "following" in the quotation may make it appear that the quotation itself was followed by a specification of the similarities indicated by Rorty's use of "we pragmatists", but this is not the case. The quoted remark gives a general schematism for his use of "we pragmatists", and the similarities meant may then vary in different contexts.

similarities among the people who are *not us*. And in these Rortyan narratives, the philosophers who are not us, the philosophers who think things that it would be better that they didn't think, include some of *us*, like Sellars and Wittgenstein and Dewey, when they say things that are not the things we pragmatists think.[2]

One central feature of these Rortyan narratives is that we pragmatists question a shared presupposition of non-pragmatist philosophy – a presupposition going back to Plato, or maybe even Parmenides.[3] This is the presupposition that there are two kinds of truths, or two kinds of statements. There are second rate things that get said, which people may regard as true, but which do not genuinely correspond to reality, and, in contrast, there are *genuine objective truths*. Rorty gives different versions of this narrative, and of the central presupposition, in different places, and he doesn't always just provide a grand sweep of all the philosophers who *aren't us*. He does sometimes, for example, separate the main epistemological tradition, starting with Descartes, from earlier philosophy, and also from contemporary semantic theorizing. But he takes the problems that are central in these sorts of philosophy to be rooted in fear that *our thought will get reality wrong*, that we will "lose contact" with the world (Rorty 1982: 128–30). And this fear then results in a felt need to divide thought and discourse into what is first class and genuinely in touch with reality and what is second rate and merely a matter of convention or opinion. One could indeed say that the central theme in Rorty's pragmatism is the undoing of this fear by the recognition, courtesy of Darwin, that there is no such thing as our thought losing touch with reality. We are always in causal contact with the world: our ways of speaking and thinking are the ways we have so far developed in response to the world.

Often in Rorty's telling of the narrative leading up to pragmatism, he speaks of us pragmatists as *anti-representationalists*, and of those who are not us as holding to *representationalism*. Representationalists are philosophers who "find it fruitful to think of mind or language as containing representations of reality" (Rorty 1991a: 4).[4] So representationalism sets up the question *which sorts* of

[2] See, on this aspect of Rorty's approach, Małecki 2014. Małecki describes in detail Rorty's ways of treating those of his philosophical "heroes" whose work contains all sorts of things that a Rortyan would wish weren't there.

[3] For the connection with Parmenides, see Rorty 1982: 130.

[4] On what Rorty means by "representationalism", see also Ramberg 2000, especially p. 351.

representations (or apparent representations) are capable of genuinely getting reality right. And the very idea that that is a worthwhile question is one which we pragmatists, we anti-representationalists, reject. (It is worth emphasizing here that many criticisms of Rorty as *totally misrepresenting or misusing* the ideas of the classical pragmatists or of Sellars or Wittgenstein or anyone else, does not really touch what Rorty is up to, as comes out especially in the idea that he is *misusing* them. He is *using* them, but not in the way other philosophers, in other contexts, might use them, in constructing a narrative for quite different purposes. He is deliberately ignoring similarities and differences that would count as significant in other contexts, and you can't get anywhere as a critic of Rorty by saying that Peirce or Sellars or James or Dewey holds views very different from those which are supposedly held by us pragmatists.[5])

What Rorty rejects is sometimes called "the bifurcation thesis". A bifurcationist might, for example, hold that there are some declarative sentences that have genuine truth-conditions, and others that don't; or the bifurcationist might hold that some predicates get at genuine properties of things, and others correspond merely to projections of our attitudes, and so on. So a bifurcationist might ask the question whether there are moral properties. Rorty's attacks on representationalism hang together with the idea that all versions of the bifurcation thesis depend on representationalism, which sets up the contrast between first-class representations of reality and second-class stuff: things we say that are mere expressions of our subjectivity or whatever.[6] My account of the bifurcation thesis draws on Richard Kraut (1990), who invented this label for what Rorty rejects, and argued that Rorty himself is committed despite himself to some version of the thesis.

[5] See for example Pihlström 2015. Pihlström says that Rorty "clearly misuses Peircean and Jamesian ideas, for example, by straightforwardly regarding the pragmatist tradition as based on what he calls 'anti-representationalism'" (2015: 24). But Rorty is not making anything you can regard as a straightforward claim about what the basis is of the pragmatist tradition; and he is well aware of the fact that the pragmatists said many things that could form part of a selection of representationalist texts. See Malecki 2014, and see also Rorty's discussions of what may be involved in writing the history of philosophy.

[6] This account of representationalism as underpinning various forms of bifurcationism is compatible with Rorty's further view that bifurcationism historically comes first, and leads into representationalism; see Rorty 2007a: 163.

2. Rorty, Naturalism, and Sellars's Contrast Between the "Manifest Image" and the "Scientific Image"

The dispute between us pragmatists and representationalists comes up frequently in discussions of the relevance of science to philosophy. Wilfrid Sellars is one of Rorty's heroes and counts as one of us pragmatists, but there is also the Wilfrid Sellars whom Rorty thinks we would be better off forgetting. The Sellars that Rorty thinks we should forget is the one who is famous for the contrast he made between the manifest image of man-in-the-world and the scientific image, and then – this is the part Rorty really doesn't like – Sellars invented the pseudo-problem of how the two images could be reconciled. (Rorty 1998c: 144; also Rorty 2010: 58). The question Rorty rejects as a pseudo-problem is the question how things that are part of the manifest image, part of the ways we usually think about ourselves and the world, are related to the scientific ways of thinking about what there is in the world. When Rorty calls this a pseudo-problem, he is putting it alongside all the philosophical discussions of so-called "location problems" or "placement problems". These are the supposed problems of how philosophy can deal with things that don't seem to be capable of fitting into the natural world as investigated by scientists (or about which you might think there is a problem how they can be fitted in). An enormous amount of philosophical work has been devoted to these problems. Rorty has an extensive discussion of these supposed problems in his late essay, "Naturalism and Quietism" (2007b). He refers to a number of formulations of the problems, including a well-known passage from Frank Jackson (1998). Here I quote an earlier expression of the view of Jackson's to which Rorty is responding:

> At least some of the diversity in our world conceals an underlying identity of ingredients. The diversity is a matter of the same elements differently selected and arranged. But if metaphysics seeks comprehension in terms of limited ingredients, it is continually going to be faced with the problem of location. Because the ingredients *are* limited, some putative features of the world are not going to appear explicitly in the story told in the favored terms. The question then will be whether the features nevertheless figure *implicitly* in the story. Serious metaphysics is simultaneously discriminatory and putatively complete, and the combination of these two facts means that there is bound to be a whole range of putative features of our world up for either elimination or location. (Jackson 1994: 163).

On Jackson's account, the question how to locate some putative feature of the world depends upon taking what we say about that feature to be a genuine representation of how things are in the world.[7]

In response to views like that of Jackson, Rorty argues that you can be a naturalist without taking supposed "location problems" seriously. He rejects the whole idea of putative features of the world about which you'd have to worry whether they are genuinely features of the world. Naturalists of the sort Rorty thinks we should be "have no use for the notion of 'merely putative feature of the world' unless this is taken to mean something like 'topic not worth talking about'." (Rorty 2007b:152). If the current state of philosophy is described as involving disagreement between hard-nosed naturalists for whom location problems are central and quietists who don't take such questions seriously, Rorty is happy to call himself a quietist. But, in "Naturalism and Quietism" (2007b), he is also willing to identify himself as a kind of naturalist, though not the sort of naturalist who takes there to be "location problems". If *they* are hard-nosed naturalists, he is a soft-nosed naturalist. He picks up Huw Price's idea of naturalism, and I'll touch briefly on that.[8]

Price is in some ways a kind of Rortyan pragmatist, a kind of quietist pragmatist, who has worked out a form of naturalism that does not lead into metaphysical accounts of what (on the one hand) is *really* in the world and can be referred to, and what (on the other hand) is *not genuinely there*.[9] In other words, what Price wants to avoid is exactly the kind of naturalistic metaphysics you can see in the quotation from Jackson. You can get into that sort of metaphysical question by thinking in terms of there being substantial semantic relations between *the things we say* and *things in the world*, so there is then a question *which* of the things we say have actually got *things out there in the world* to correspond with. So far as philosophy then takes science seriously, *and* so far as we are committed to substantial semantic relations to things in the world, we seem to be confronted with problems about things that the scientific picture of the world apparently has no room for – so-called location problems. But

[7] See Jackson 1998: 117. The point Jackson is making there about ethics can be generalized and applied to other "putative features of the world". But cf. also Price 2009. Price argues that giving up on representationalism (as for example by accepting semantic deflationism) blocks a well-trafficked route to location problems, but may leave other routes open.

[8] But see also Brandom 2000a for a very clear account of Rorty's naturalism.

[9] For the relation between Price's "global expressivism" and Rorty's historicist, anti-representationalist, Darwinian pragmatism, see, for example, Rydenfelt 2015.

Price's argument is that we can have a form of philosophical naturalism which does not make any theoretical use of the idea of substantial semantic relations between words and the world – a kind of naturalism which focuses instead on *us human beings as part of the natural order*. This sort of naturalism is not concerned with word-world relations but with the functions in our lives of the various sorts of terms and concepts and forms of discourse we use. The naturalist of Price's sort (the "subject-naturalist") is not worried about putative features of the world that might not be *there* to be seriously referred to. Instead, this sort of naturalist investigates the various forms of human discourse and their functions in something like the way an anthropologist would.

3. More About Rorty, Price and Naturalism: The Bifurcation Thesis and the Inheritance From Hume

Rorty's hostility to the bifurcation thesis is quite simple. The bifurcation thesis divides forms of discourse into those which connect up with genuine worldly states of affairs, and those forms of discourse which lack genuine truth-conditions. For Rorty the issue for any form of discourse is: is it useful to engage in that kind of discourse? – does it help the kind of organisms we are to cope with things?[10] If, like Rorty, you reject representationalism, that clears the way to giving up all the problems to which representationalism leads, – it clears the way to giving up all the forms of the bifurcation thesis, and all the problems about how the scientific image of the world can allow for ethics, or causation or modality or whatever else. This is not giving up on the responsiveness of our statements and beliefs to how things are – which is for Rorty (following his reading of Davidson and Sellars) a matter of holistically understood causal relations between us and the rest of the universe.[11]

Price's relation to the bifurcation thesis isn't so simple. His story about it develops from his rejection of contemporary expressivism, and his development of his own kind of expressivism. In the 1980s, the term "expressivism" came in as a label for views that go back to Hume on ethics and causation – views that include mid-twentieth century emotivism like that of Stevenson.[12] Expressivists have usually been committed to some version of

[10] See also Brandom's more elaborate account of Rorty's view in Brandom 2000b: Part VIII.

[11] See, for example, Rorty 1991b: 156–159; also Rorty's response to Brandom, Rorty 2000: 185–7.

[12] The word "expressivism" was used earlier by Charles Taylor in relation to Herder's views, in his book *Hegel* (1975). But the general use of the word in contemporary anglophone philosophy begins with

the bifurcation thesis, since they hold that ethical discourse (or modal discourse or whatever other discourse) is not genuinely fact-stating, while other sorts of discourse, say in the sciences, are genuinely fact-stating. Price has argued that such views are not tenable, and that the arguments used by expressivists, if taken seriously, undermine the bifurcation that expressivists usually go in for between fact-stating and non-fact-stating forms of discourse. (The resulting, Pricean, view can be described as a sort of global expressivism.) That move, getting rid of bifurcation, puts Price close to Rorty; but Price then picks up from Sellars a kind of biologized notion of what it is for a form of discourse to be responsive to the facts, and he re-introduces the kind of distinction between forms of discourse that the expressivists had been arguing for. Here Price is using parts of Sellars's thought that Rorty recommended should be forgotten. And here Price is privileging science, in the kind of way he defines what the relevant sort of responsiveness is. It is a matter of responsiveness to an organism's environment, where this would not include such things as a person's responsiveness to moral considerations, for example. This appears to be a new guise for the old expressivist bifurcation that drew a line between science and ethics, the former being truth-apt in a sense in which the latter is not.[13]

Although there is a distance between Price and Rorty on bifurcationism, there are other things they have in common, which are important in thinking about their relation to Wittgenstein. I mean especially the kind of theoretical stance that Rorty and Price take to be appropriate in philosophical thinking about us and our ways of talking and thinking. Rorty's view comes out in a passage where he asks how one could take the noises made by some organisms in a community as assertions (Rorty 2010: 255). The noises can be assertions only if the organisms at least sometimes try to get the other organisms to make the same noise that they themselves make. Rorty talks this way, because he wants to avoid describing *people* as *trying to reason with other people or trying to persuade other people to agree with them* (which is hardly a matter of your getting people to make the same noises that you have made). Rorty is speaking from an imaginary biologized stance for description of what you take to be available

Blackburn and Gibbard a decade later. Brandom's use of the term is significantly different; on his use and its connection with Taylor's, see Smith 2010.

[13] For an account of the problem here, see Macfarlane 2014.

for your investigation.[14] A similar stance is theorized by Price. He says that when, in philosophy, we consider the function of some kind of judgments, we *mention but should not use* the vocabulary of those who actually make such judgments. This prevents a kind of ontological contamination of the theorist's vocabulary by what the speakers of the language take themselves to be talking about, like values.[15] Although both Price and Rorty say that they reject scientism, or any conception of science as specially in touch with reality, their form of naturalism involves a very different conception from Wittgenstein's of what it is for a philosopher to attend to the "natural history of human beings" (Wittgenstein 1958: §415).[16] And there is a question whether Rorty and Price reject some forms of what they recognize to be "scientism", but in fact accept something which one might take to be an alternative form of scientism. Both of them take themselves to have a Darwinian or post-Darwinian approach to philosophy, to how philosophy conceives what it is attending to. So the question is: how does this compare to Wittgenstein? That will be the subject of the second half of this essay. I'll start by looking at the kind of bifurcationism that you do have in early Wittgenstein. It has three significant features. It is (in intention anyway) underlaid not by metaphysics but by logic; it is not tied to naturalism; and it is motivated by a striking understanding of the aim of philosophical activity. After that, I will look at some passages in later Wittgenstein that seem particularly open to a Rortyan kind of reading – to Rorty's kind of packaging of Wittgenstein as one of us pragmatists.

4. Early Wittgenstein, the Supposed Representationalist: A Contrast With Hume's Bifurcationism

Rorty and those influenced by him take *early* Wittgenstein not only *not* to be one of us pragmatists but to be an arch-representationalist and bifurcationist. They read the *Tractatus* as providing a theory of linguistic representation which rigorously distinguishes genuine descriptive discourse from everything else. This portrayal is misleading; but here we need to recall how Rorty constructs narratives, and what counts for or against them. One thing to say about the

[14] In the context of these remarks, "community" is used by Rorty in the same way it might be used of a "community" of any sort of organism, ants or beavers or whatever. But see also Rorty's later criticism of his own "quasi-Nietzschean and pseudo-Darwinian attempt to assimilate what we do to what the animals do" (Rorty 2015: 866–8).

[15] See, e.g., Price 2011: 313–15; also 262–4.

[16] For discussion of these issues, see Macarthur 2014.

Rortyan story about early Wittgenstein is that it is *unhelpful*. There are interesting philosophical issues involved in Rorty's ambivalent relation to later Wittgenstein, and we can see these better if we don't caricature early Wittgenstein.

Rorty repeatedly mocked the idea that some chunk of the world is what makes our true statements true – the idea that out there in the world independently of us, there are sentence-shaped pieces of non-linguistic reality, facts, for our statements to correspond to. These fact-things are supposed to be out there in reality quite independently of language. But, in the *Tractatus*, the notion of a fact and that of a sentence are (as Thomas Ricketts puts it) interdependent: "facts are what are representable in sentences" (Ricketts 1996: 90). The notion of "fact" here is not that of a sentence-shaped chunk of non-linguistic reality, since there is no independent notion of *being sentence-shaped*, which something out in reality could have, and which would make possible its correspondence with sentences. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein attempts to make clear the logical features of one kind of sentence. He lays out one kind of logical use, and part of the laying out of this use involves the idea of there being "one and the same reality" that corresponds to such a sentence and to its negation (Wittgenstein 1963: 4.0621) The idea is that there are pairs of sentences, such that what will make one sentence of the pair true will make the other false. The kind of way two sentences of this sort are related to each other, by one being false if the other is true and vice versa, is tied to there being one and the same reality that makes one true and the other false. And it's also tied to its being possible to use the two sentences the opposite way round, so that each says in the new use what the other one said in the old use, because there is nothing in the two sentences that ties the sentences to one use rather than the other. That, then, is part of how the *Tractatus* sets out one kind of use of sentences. The description of the use of these sentences to say something, is at the same time a presentation of how negation comes into that use: a sentence's being reversible, being usable to say what its negation had said, is part of its use to say something is so. It is at least arguable that this casts light on negation. (I mean that it can be illuminating in something like the way in which the connection that Frege makes between an arithmetical function and a concept can be illuminating. You are providing a kind of model that shifts how you see things, enables you to see connections.)

One striking thing that is also in the *Tractatus* is the statement that our everyday language is a part of the human organism and is just as complicated (Wittgenstein 1963: 4.002). Wittgenstein thought that there were an enormous number of complicated tacit conventions, by which we understand our language. But there are also lots of conventions which are not tacit, which aid in the use of language. One of these things which help us adapt language to our needs is *definitions*. Wittgenstein speaks of them as "Behelfe der Darstellung", aids to representation – and that term can be used for all of the linguistic devices through which everyday language, and scientific language as well, are adapted to our needs. Definitions may be formulated in indicative sentences, but their function is unlike that of picturing sentences.[17] Definitions have distinctive logical features, different from the logical features of picturing sentences that Wittgenstein lays out in detail. For example, one important logical difference is that definitions do not have negations. Wittgenstein's general view is that there can be various kinds of sentences in everyday language and in scientific language that work as *auxiliaries*: definitions are simply one case. Two important further kinds of case are mathematical equations and principles of mechanics. In any of these cases, you can make clear what the use is of these different kinds of sentence, where laying out the use includes clarifying the distinctive logical features of that kind of use, as the absence of a negation is among the logical features of sentences in use as definitions,[18] and as the sort of generality that principles of mechanics have can be laid out and seen to be different from that of empirical generalizations. Wittgenstein never speaks of these auxiliaries as bits of nonsense, though they are plainly logically distinct from picturing sentences. They resemble tautologies in that they lack sense.

Although Wittgenstein says that there are all these complicated conventions through which everyday language is understood, he has no interest in attending to these conventions in any detail. There are various reasons for his dealing in detail with mathematical equations, causal principles and laws of mechanics, but we shouldn't suppose that the particular kinds of conventions he does deal with are all that there is room for on the *Tractatus* view. Thus, for example, a

[17] For more about the significance of definitions for understanding how the *Tractatus* works, see White 2002: 110. On the *Tractatus* view of definitions see Wittgenstein 1963: 3.343 and 4.241–4.243.

[18] Contrast the account by Richard Robinson, of what it is for a sentence to be a definition in some use, and in some other use a report of actual usage. He takes this difference to be a matter of the mental state of the speaker (1950: 13).

neo-Aristotelian account of biological organisms could easily be set up as a further example of how principles of various sorts make it possible to adapt language to our needs.

You could certainly say that there is a kind of bifurcation in Wittgenstein's treatment of language in the *Tractatus*, in that there are bipolar picturing sentences, and there are all the rest, and none of the rest are representations of anything's being the case. Again this is illustrated by definitions. While they may be expressed in indicative sentences, they function as rules (Wittgenstein 1963: 4.241). But we need to note how very different this is from the kind of bifurcation that is typical of contemporary forms of expressivism, and also different from the Humean expressivism that is the ancestor of contemporary expressivist theories (and also the ancestor of Price's pragmatist/naturalist global expressivism). Consider this statement of Hume's:

> There is, then, nothing new either discover'd or produc'd in any objects by their constant conjunction, and by the uninterrupted resemblance of their relations of succession and contiguity. But 'tis from this resemblance, that the ideas of necessity, of power, and of efficacy, are deriv'd. These ideas, therefore, represent not any thing, that does or can belong to the objects, which are constantly conjoin'd. (Hume 1978: 164)

Hume is claiming that, although we think of objects that are constantly conjoined as necessarily connected, our thinking does not represent the objects as having something that they do or can actually have. On Hume's view of "nature", being constantly conjoined is the kind of thing that *can* hold of objects in nature, but necessary connection is *not* the sort of thing that can hold between such objects. *There is no such thing in nature* as objects having this relation. This is a metaphysical view, and is then tied to Hume's giving an alternative account of the thoughts in which we appear to be ascribing to objects something that they cannot have.[19] What Wittgenstein is doing is very different, although it may look similar: after all, he says that *there is no causal nexus* that could back up causal inference, inference from the occurrence of one thing to something altogether different. So this looks like a statement of metaphysical impossibility. But I would argue that the apparent similarity to Hume is misleading. Wittgenstein's idea (or at any rate his aim) is to bring out sharply and clearly the logical features of sentences used in different ways, so that if this is done well, you would not even run into the kind of problem that

[19] See Stroud 1993 on the problem here.

Hume is trying to solve. There are picturing sentences that have a negation that is also a picturing sentence; and there are also sentences that may have some kind of use, but which do not have negations that are picturing sentences. The idea of causal propositions as expressing necessary connections involves a confused running together of these different sorts of use of sentences. Get the different uses clear, and the confusion will evaporate.[20]

In the quotation from Hume, you can see a form of representationalism. There is a question whether what we are representing as being the case, when we treat causation as a kind of necessity, is indeed something that can be the case; and Hume's answer is No. So Hume holds that some of the ways we represent objects as being, they can be, whereas other ways we represent objects as being (as in our ascriptions of virtue, beauty and necessary connection) *don't* represent objects as being some way that they can be. Here representationalism is important in the argument leading to Hume's bifurcationism. In Wittgenstein's quite different kind of bifurcationism, there is no appeal of the Humean sort. There is no appeal to an idea that causal principles, for example, can't represent anything in nature, and are therefore not genuine representations. To see the difference from Hume, it helps to bear in mind how Wittgenstein first introduces the idea of indicative sentences that do a very different sort of work from picturing sentences: the first case is *definitions*. If you see the kind of use definitions have, and their logical features, you see their differences from picturing sentences.

There are two further points to be made about the sort of bifurcationism in the *Tractatus*.

i. It is in an important respect unlike the bifurcationism that Rorty condemns. What he condemns is the idea that there are statements that are first rate genuine representations of reality and other statements that are *lesser*. When we think these latter things, our thought is not in touch with genuine properties of things in reality. And you certainly get something like that in Hume. Causal necessity is not *in objects* in the way shape (for example) is; beauty is not genuinely in the objects we may call beautiful. But this is very different from Wittgenstein. Mathematical

[20] A fuller account of what is at stake here would draw on Wittgenstein's remarks about supposed synthetic necessary truths, in conversation with Schlick in 1929. Those remarks draw on ideas from the *Tractatus* that Wittgenstein still held in 1929. For a different sort of account of how the logical clarification could go, see Tejedor 2015, especially chapter 4.

equations, though (according to the *Tractatus*) they do not represent anything as being the case, do not have some kind of metaphysical inferiority. They don't miss out on saying what reality is like. It's a complicated question how far the views of contemporary bifurcationist-expressivists like Blackburn resemble Hume's kind of metaphysical bifurcationism or Wittgensteinian logical bifurcationism. It may be that they simply fail to pay attention to there being these very different sorts of account.

ii. Wittgenstein's views in the Tractatus, as I have set them out, resemble some of Ramsey's, especially his account of causal laws in "General Propositions and Causality" (Ramsey 1931), for example in the significance of the absence of negation in the case of some uses of indicative sentences. And the general account of the Tractatus, as I've set it out, in its allowing for various ways in which language is adapted to our needs and purposes, could be said to resemble pragmatism. It is a mistake to think that these strands in Wittgenstein's thought, when they are noted in Wittgenstein's later thinking, reflect the influence of Ramsey. As is brought out by James Griffin (1964), the influence goes the other way. (See also Glock 2005 on the relation between Wittgenstein and Ramsey.)

5. Early Wittgenstein and Naturalistic Explanations: The Contrast Between Wittgenstein and Neopragmatism

Having started from early Wittgenstein's difference from Hume, we are now in a good position to see the difference between Wittgenstein early-and-late, and neopragmatists like Rorty and Price. I will do this in two stages, in Parts 5 and 6.

Price is very helpful here. He points out that expressivists like Hume make two kinds of point, one positive, one negative.[21] The negative point that expressivists make is that some region of thought, or some type of language, does not actually represent anything out there in the natural world. The statement from Hume (1978) in Part 4 provides an example of the negative point. The idea of necessary connection doesn't represent anything actually in objects. The positive part of an expressivist view is the alternative account the expressivist gives of the problematic region of thought or language. Price

[21] For one formulation of Price's view, see Price 2011: 312–15. See also Price 2008 and Price 2015.

argues that you can simply drop the negative point altogether if you give up representationalism.[22] But (Price says) you can nevertheless keep hold of the positive part of the expressivist view, the positive account of what is actually involved in the problematic region of thought or language. Again we can stick with Hume as our example. Hume gives an account of our conception of causal necessity, by explaining how that conception is produced in us. The account is totally naturalistic – indeed it is closely tied to Hume's aim of revolutionizing our understanding of human life, on the model of the Newtonian revolution in our understanding of matter. Hume invites us to take up a point of view from which we see our thinking about causation, or our thinking about virtue or beauty, as natural phenomena, and then we can see how these phenomena work by tracing their development in us, in accordance with the basic principles of how human nature works. Hume's account does not appeal at any point to the reality independent of our minds, of causal necessity, or beauty or virtue. The account is (as one could put it) ontologically uncontaminated. There is a striking analogy with Price's own naturalism. If we compare Hume's naturalism with that of Price, we see a shift from a Newtonian model of naturalizing explanation to a Darwinian model. As Price sees a naturalistic approach in philosophy, the naturalistic philosopher provides an explanatory story of the genesis of the concepts he is explaining: the story explains how the concepts were evolutionarily useful. So there is a genetic account of the concepts in question; but because this naturalist explanation is Darwinian rather than Newtonian (as naturalist explanation had been with Hume), the genetic account is now a kind of evolutionary socio-linguistics, rather than an account of how concepts get produced within the mind by the mechanisms of associationist psychology. The contemporary naturalist giving this Darwinian style explanatory account, though, closely resembles Hume, in eschewing any actual use of the concepts being explained. They are mentioned but not used in the account, and so the account itself is ontologically totally non-committal. So that's an important similarity, while an important difference from Hume is that the contemporary pragmatist style of explanation lays stress on the function of the apparently problematic concepts being explained. If one sees their function, their practical application, it will be clear how the kind of social animal we are came to develop them.

[22] See also Price's discussion of the non–necessity of getting into metaphysics, with the kind of expressivism he argues for, in Price 2017.

There is, then, a kind of naturalistic account of elements of our thought, which comes in two styles, the Newtonian (as with Hume) and the Darwinian, but in both cases the naturalistic philosopher provides a developmental story that is meant to explain some apparently problematic feature of our thought, and the explanation is meant not to appeal to anything that might be taken not to be a denizen of the natural world. So our use of discourse apparently about problematic sorts of entities is explained without any commitment to there being any such things. The explanation is given from an entirely external point of view. (See also, for example, Rorty's repeated use of descriptions of human language in terms of the making of marks and noises by certain organisms, where the making of the noises and marks is fitted into a general theoretical treatment of how the organisms interact with their environment. See, for example, Rorty 1991a: 100.)

There is a big difference between any such account and what Wittgenstein does, early or later on. I'll consider early Wittgenstein first. The most important difference between Wittgenstein's approach and either a Newtonian or Darwinian naturalistic account lies in Wittgenstein's understanding of what philosophy is. It's an activity of logical clarification. Get the logical clarification done, and the apparently problematic feature of certain ways we think or speak *disappears*. Wittgenstein's conception here draws on Hertz – on Hertz's ideas about how the language used in physics could be clarified.[23] Hertz showed how three different systems of mechanics could each be used to represent the phenomena of matter in motion, but the three systems don't use the same basic concepts. The concept of force is a fundamental concept in only one of the systems. Its use as a basic concept belongs to one particular way we may represent the phenomena. The logical clarification effected by laying out the different systems of mechanics may help us to get free of troubling questions about what *force* is, or what there is in the world that corresponds to the concept. You don't then need an ontology which answers questions about whether there is such a thing as force, nor would you need an account of human beings from a quasi-scientific standpoint explaining their discourse or thought about forces. – But you might ask, if I am suggesting that we see Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy as drawing on Hertz, isn't it then close to pragmatism? After all, the idea is that the different forms of representation of the phenomena may be more or less suitable for different purposes, and we

[23] See Hertz 1899 and Griffin 1964: esp. 99–108; also Tougas 1996.

may choose whichever suits our needs (Hertz 1899: 3).[24] This is a point Wittgenstein illustrates in the *Tractatus* by using the analogy with different grids, any of which can be used to represent a pattern of black spots on a white surface; see Wittgenstein 1963: 6.341. How we choose which grid to use depends on how fine-grained we want our representation to be. So isn't this close to pragmatism? In fact, that's not obvious. We should not assume that what Wittgenstein is doing when he makes clear that there are different forms of representation of the same phenomena between which we can choose, he is giving a pragmatist sort of argument for the significance of our needs in determining how we can represent things. What may look like a pragmatist sort of point is actually a part of the logical clarification of the ways in which we do think, and its aim is to make the apparent problems disappear. – Someone might say, "So much the worse! Early Wittgenstein should have been *more* of a pragmatist, and less of a problem disappearer!" But the point I want to make right now is that, so far as there is a kind of anti-representationalism in Hertz's treatment of *force* in mechanics, and in Wittgenstein's picking up of Hertz's approach to scientific theories, this involves only a limited similarity with pragmatism.[25] And early Wittgenstein's use of logical clarification to make what had been taken to be a problem *disappear* is also unlike naturalistic approaches that explain apparently problematic forms of thought or discourse in terms of natural laws of human thinking or the natural laws of the development of language. (It should be added that Rorty does use the language of "making problems disappear", but what he invariably means is that you stop talking in a certain way. For example, if you stop talking in a representationalist way, certain questions don't come up, – as the question whether causal language corresponds to anything that is really there would no longer come up if one stopped talking about language as representing reality.)

Before turning to later Wittgenstein, I'll summarize what I have been arguing. Early Wittgenstein is a kind of bifurcationist, all right, but his bifurcationism depends on logical differences, not metaphysical differences. His approach is not a member of the family of naturalistic philosophical treatments of problems, including that of Hume and that of Huw Price, which undercut representational accounts of problematic issues by a naturalistic

[24] See Hertz 1899: 3. For some problems with Hertz's account, see Hüttemann 2001, and see also Saunders 1998 on Hertz and Carnap.

[25] The pair "representationalism"/"anti-representationalism" has the feature noted by Dummett in connection with "realism"/"anti-realism", of being capable of local or global application.

developmental story. The naturalistic developmental stories they tell are meant to be explanatory. Wittgenstein's treatment of problematic issues resembles rather the philosophical approach of Hertz, in emphasizing logical clarification as a method by which philosophical problems can be supposedly dissolved.

I'll turn now to later Wittgenstein.

6. Later Wittgenstein and Rortyan Pragmatism: Repackaging Wittgenstein

I want to focus on three quotations from later Wittgenstein, all of which may appear to fit nicely with the idea that Wittgenstein's approach is very close to that of the pragmatists. The quotations also, at first glance, seem to fit well with Rorty's ideas about what is valuable in Wittgenstein's writings, with what Rorty takes to be the good anti-representationalist stuff:

i. "But then what does the peculiar inexorability of mathematics consist in?" —Would not the inexorability with which two follows one and three two be a good example? —But presumably this means: follows in the *series of cardinal numbers*; for in a different series something different follows. And isn't *this* series just *defined* by this sequence? — "Is that supposed to mean that it is equally correct whichever way a person counts, and that anyone can count as he pleases?" —We should presumably not call it "counting" if everyone said the numbers one after the other *anyhow*; but of course it is not simply a question of a name. For what we call "counting" is an important part of our life's activities... Counting (and that means: counting like *this*) is a technique that is employed daily in the most various operations in our lives. And that is why we learn to count as we do: with endless practice, with merciless exactitude; that is why it is inexorably insisted that we shall all say "two" after "one", "three" after "two" and so on.[26] —"But is this counting only a *use*, then; isn't there also some truth corresponding to this sequence?" The *truth* is that counting has proved to pay. — "Then do you want to say that 'being true' means: being usable (or useful)?" —No, not that; but that it can't be said of the series of natural numbers —any more than of

[26] Here speaks the former primary school teacher. – Lots of people still allow, and in the not very distant past even more people allowed, variant ways of counting even within the same communities.

our language —that it is true, but: that it is usable, and, above all, *it is used*. (Wittgenstein 1956: Part I, § 4)

ii. But still, I must only infer what really *follows*! —Is this supposed to mean: only what follows, going by the rules of inference; or is it supposed to mean: only what follows, going by *such* rules of inference as somehow agree with some (sort of) reality? Here what is before our minds in a vague way is that this reality is something very abstract, very general, and very rigid. Logic is a kind of ultra-physics, the description of the 'logical structure' of the world, which we perceive through a kind of ultra-experience (with the understanding, e.g.). Here perhaps inferences like the following come to mind: "The stove is smoking, so the chimney is out of order again". (And *that* is how this conclusion is drawn! Not like this: "The stove is smoking, and whenever the stove smokes the chimney is out of order; and so...".) (Wittgenstein 1956: Part I, § 8)

iii. "But doesn't it follow with logical necessity that you get two when you add one to one, and three when you add one to two? and isn't this inexorability the same as that of logical inference?" —Yes! it is the same. — "But isn't there a truth corresponding to logical inference? Isn't it *true* that this follows from that?" ... And how do we use this proposition? — What would happen if we made a different inference —*how* should we get into conflict with truth? (Wittgenstein 1956: Part I, § 5)

What makes these quotations fit so nicely with Rorty's conception of the good Wittgenstein is the way Wittgenstein responds, in each of the quotations, to the idea that our mathematical and logical practices are correct only so far as they correspond to a reality.[27] In response to this insistence on the importance of correspondence to reality, Wittgenstein (in each of the quotations) *turns to our practices*. In quotation (i), he turns to the practice of counting; in (ii), he turns to the practice of inferring; and in (iii), he asks what kind of difference it would make if we inferred differently, what would this actually come to, and what would be the matter with it?

But I think this similarity between Rortyan pragmatism and what is going on in those passages from Wittgenstein may be misleading, if one doesn't see *what else* is going on in the Wittgenstein passages. Recall here the explanation that Rorty gave of how he *repackages* the philosophers whom he means when he speaks of "us pragmatists". To get a close resemblance between Rortyan

[27] See also Diamond 1976: Lectures 25 and 26.

pragmatism and what is going on in the passages that I have just quoted, you need to do a lot of "repackaging" of Wittgenstein. Here is how Rorty describes "pragmatic Wittgensteinians" – which means those who read Wittgenstein the same way he does:

> On their view, Wittgenstein's contribution to philosophy consists principally of the critique of ostensive definition, the private-language argument, and the rule-following argument. So the *Tractatus* strikes them as a false start... Pragmatic Wittgensteinians think that his really important contribution was to formulate arguments that anticipate, complement, and reinforce Quine's and Davidson's criticism of the language-fact distinction, and Sellars' and Brandom's criticism of the idea of knowledge by acquaintance. On their view, comparing and contrasting the writings of these later philosophers with the *Philosophical Investigations* help us filter out what is merely idiosyncratic in Wittgenstein's writings. Pragmatic Wittgensteinians do not want to recapture Wittgenstein's own way of thinking, but rather to restate his best arguments in more effective ways. (Rorty 2007a: 164-165)

In the rest of Part 6, I want to look at what Rorty thinks we should filter out from our reading of Wittgenstein, and at what more there is in quotations (i), (ii), and (iii) above than Rorty likes. Then we may be able to see whether filtering it out and forgetting it is a good idea. And we can see how far Wittgenstein's attention to our practices resembles that of such neopragmatists as Rorty and Price.

What is first of all very striking in the three quotations from Wittgenstein is the play of different voices in them. Wittgenstein takes himself to be responding to – or, rather, he takes himself to have to respond to –what in us leads into the conception of mathematics and of logical inference that you hear in those voices. What you can see in the quoted passages, and even more in *Philosophical Investigations*, is the importance of genuinely untying the knots we have got ourselves tangled in: you see Wittgenstein's idea that in philosophy you really have to undo the philosophical knot and not just snip it off. What the voices speak, in the passages I have quoted, and in the related passages in the *Investigations*, is the entanglement we are in. This idea of us as entangled in philosophical knots is the concept that goes along with, and is the other side of, philosophical disentanglement, logical clarification. And, in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, the attention to our practices is part of the attempt at disentanglement.

One of Wittgenstein's basic ideas here is that we fail to take in the aspects of things that would really be helpful to us. They are "hidden by their simplicity

and familiarity". We are unable to notice something, he says, "because it is always in front of our eyes" (Wittgenstein 1958: § 129). Take the case of logical inference, as discussed in the two quotations (ii) and (iii). It may appear that logical inference is some thing quite special, in that if we have got such-and-such statements as premises, then *these particular rules* (the rules of logical inference) already provide the connection to the truth of the conclusion. The logical order connects *thinking by these rules* with reaching a conclusion that genuinely follows. For there to really be this link, there has to be something more in our inferring than just our going by this or that set of rules that we happen to have learned! And so it seems that we cannot look to our actual practice, for we won't be able to see *there* what inference enables us to achieve, we won't be able to see there, in the actual way we infer, what is essential, what logical inference must have. –When we think like that, what is happening is that, although we are in fact concerned with the phenomenon of logical inference that goes on in our lives, we are unable to direct our attention to what that phenomenon is like. We are looking for what it essentially involves, and we take it that the details of our practice, the details of what it is actually like, cannot be relevant. (That's the point Wittgenstein makes in *Philosophical Investigations*, § 52.) In response to this way of thinking, Wittgenstein says, in quotation (ii), that *this* is how we infer: "The stove is smoking, so the chimney is out of order again". What Wittgenstein wants to bring out there is not only that *that* is what inference looks like, but also that the interlocutor, the person whom he is addressing, she too would *recognize* just that sort of going-on as *inference*. Inference is *recognizable*, it has a complex sort of *look*. And if the interlocutor came as an explorer into an unknown country, and began to learn the language, she would indeed count this sort of thing as *the people there making inferences*.[28] Wittgenstein in the *Investigations* speaks of all that belongs to the face, the physiognomy, of following rules, among us: what that looks like (1958: § 235). The kind of thing that following a rule is, you see *in all that in our life is part of its face*. And similarly with inferring. Here too there is what we are able to recognize as *inferring,* within the overall pattern of life with inferring. You can

[28] My argument here is based on Wittgenstein 1958: § 206. See also Luria 1976. Even though Luria overestimates the significance of the capacity to use formally set out syllogisms, he can easily recognize the uses of deductive reasoning by the nonliterate peasants whom he studied in Kirghizia and Kazakhstan. See especially Luria 1976: 114–115. Luria notes that the subjects of the study are unwilling to reason from premises with no connection to experience. This gives inference among them a somewhat different "physiognomy" from inference among those with an education, but it does not make it unrecognizable as inference.

say that it belongs to the *essence* of what inferring is that we can take in a particular case of inferring as *that*, in seeing it within our ordinary practices, as in the example Wittgenstein mentions in quotation (ii). This is a grammatical point; and what Wittgenstein is doing in that quotation is trying to make the grammar open to view; something we can take in. This is all part, then, of how he responds to philosophical entanglement about inferring. The kind of thing that inferring is, you see in our life with inferring.

7. The Rortyan Repackaging of Wittgenstein, and Wittgenstein's Attention to our Practices

Here I want to make a general claim. When Wittgenstein attends to our practices, this is because he takes it that our view of them is, in a sense, *impeded*. This was the point of the remark I quoted in Part 6, about how the aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden by their simplicity and familiarity. Wittgenstein doesn't so much attend to our practices as attend to how one can fail to take in striking features of those practices. So it is attention always at the same time to the entangled person, and to what may make it possible for her to accept a different way of seeing those practices.

This is a fundamentally different understanding of the kind of activity philosophy is, and Wittgenstein's understanding of that activity is one of the things Rorty thinks needs to be filtered out of a pragmatist reading of Wittgenstein, to get at the better stuff. This filtering out reflects a really deep difference in the spirit of Rorty's philosophy from that of Wittgenstein. For Rorty, *the* basic term of criticism for the philosophical approaches that we should put behind us can be set out in Darwinian terms. We are creatures who have evolved ways of talking, as elephants have evolved trunks, and like the elephant's trunk, our developing of this or that way of talking may enable us to cope better with our environment and with our lives together. But some of our ways of talking we'd do best by giving up. We should go on to something better. Rorty sees philosophers like Locke or Descartes as having developed new ways of speaking, but these ways of speaking have turned out to be dead ends. He is explicit that his Darwinian social practice view of language has no place for the idea of any way of speaking as reflecting a kind of entanglement in our words. Just as we should cease asking what entities are available to be referred to by our claims, and we can then stop doing metaphysics, we can cease asking how we got led into our philosophical questionings, and can then

stop doing Wittgensteinian philosophical disentanglings. In response to Wittgenstein's philosophical aims, in response to his would-be responsiveness to philosophical confusions, Rorty says "C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre" (Rorty 2007a: 169). Like much that Rorty says, this is a recommendation, a recommendation of what the war is that philosophers *should* engage in. Rorty thought the worst bit of Wittgenstein's later philosophy was what he had to say about philosophy, what sort of battle *he* took it to be.[29] The right strategy in Rorty's war is the leaving behind of ways of speaking that didn't pan out, or that are no longer worthwhile, not the disentangling of what got us into them. Hence Wittgenstein's main contribution to *Rorty's* war is arguments that aid this *leaving behind*. You can contrast Wittgenstein's remark to Anscombe, "You cannot go too carefully about a philosophical error, you do not know how much truth there may be in it" (Geach 2008: xiv; see also Wittgenstein 1967: § 460.) The deep difference between Wittgenstein's understanding of philosophy and that of Rorty comes out also in Rorty's desire to jettison from the repackaged Wittgenstein the idea of philosophy as concerned with enabling one to find one's way back after one has lost one's sense of where one is.

8. Repackaging Wittgenstein: Philosophy And Progress.

I just said that the spirit of Rorty's philosophy is deeply different from that of Wittgenstein. It is also a spirit of progress, in exactly the sense in which Wittgenstein was particularly suspicious of our conceptions of progress. Wittgenstein did not think there couldn't be progress in philosophy; but it is not a matter of *moving on*.[30]

Both Rorty and Price work with a Darwinian explanatory picture. Our modes of thinking and speaking are, as Rorty repeatedly says, in touch with the

[29] See Rorty 2007a, especially the remarks about *Philosophical Investigations*, §§ 89–133, (2007a: 164); see also 2007a: 161–2. Rorty's use of the famous Bosquet remark about the charge of the Light Brigade, as a comment on Wittgenstein's preferred philosophical approach, is quite odd, since Wittgenstein's responses to confusion hardly resemble a mad cavalry charge into gunfire.

[30] When Wittgenstein objected to the spirit of his times, he spoke of that spirit as expressing itself in "an onwards movement, in building ever larger and more complicated structures", and he said that it tries to grasp the world "in its variety" (Wittgenstein 1975: 7). Rortyan progress does not involve building more complicated structures, but consists in the ever onwards development and taking up of new vocabularies, leaving behind those which have had their day, or which simply didn't pan out. Nor does Rortyan progress "try to grasp the world in its variety"; – it doesn't try to grasp the world. That it is nevertheless an expression of the same spirit as that with which Wittgenstein contrasts his own is, I think, clear.

world, causally responsive to it, in the same kind of way as the hummingbird's nest-building practices are in touch with the world and causally responsive to it. We may give up some scientific vocabulary, for example, when we find a more useful one, just as hummingbirds may come up with a different method of nest-building as different circumstances impinge on them. This picture can explain the usefulness of this or that way of talking about truth or knowledge, what function such talking has for the kind of complex social animals we are, for example in enabling us to coordinate what we do together. In Rorty's version of pragmatism, this picture of how we can *engage with human practice* in our philosophizing is itself meant to be socially useful.[31] Rorty would hardly deny that we *could* take seriously Wittgenstein's own conception of his aims, but the question he wants to ask is: *should* we? The Rorty idea is that, if we filter out what merely reflects Wittgenstein's own philosophical obsessions, we can then use his arguments in the service of social progress.[32]

If we see how different pragmatism in the Rortyan style is from Wittgenstein's understanding of what he is doing, *that* is not in itself a criticism of Rorty's packaging of Wittgenstein as a Rortyan pragmatist. But I want to end by putting before you how their different philosophical *aims* are reflected in the difference between Rorty's sort of naturalism and that of Wittgenstein. The double difference from Rorty comes out in *Philosophical Investigations*, in §§ 143–144 (1958). Here Wittgenstein describes what it's like to learn to develop mathematical series, including the series of natural numbers. Wittgenstein reminds us of how this gets taught, and he emphasizes that there are normal and abnormal responses to the teaching. Such teaching depends on the pupil's picking up how to go on with the series, and this is something most of us are able to do. But we can imagine a situation where this doesn't happen, and the pupil doesn't pick up the activity the way the rest of us do. Here Wittgenstein is emphasizing a fact of nature, by putting before us a picture of a natural world in which this doesn't happen. And then he asks: Why did I want to draw attention to the possibility of imagining a situation unlike ours, where things can go awry even when we try to teach a series like that of the natural numbers?

[31] See Ramberg 2007: "Typically, Rorty justifies his own commitment to Darwinian naturalism by suggesting that this vocabulary is suited to further the secularization and democratization of society that Rorty thinks we should aim for. Accordingly, there is a close tie between Rorty's construal of the naturalism he endorses and his most basic political convictions."

[32] I take this to be the central point of "Wittgenstein and the Linguistic Turn" (Rorty 2007a); but see especially pp. 169 and 174–5.

Why did he do this? He asks this (1958: § 144). He says it might help us philosophically to have that different situation drawn to our attention. It might help disentangle us from confusion we get into about what it is to go on following a rule. So what then is the double difference from Rorty? Although you can say of both Wittgenstein and Rorty, that they lead us to see the human naturalistically, as a particular kind of animal, what this comes to for Rorty is very different from what it is for Wittgenstein. Rorty's naturalism takes an external point of view on human vocabularies, in which they appear as tools that one sort of animal uses for coping with its environment, as wood-chopping teeth are tools the beaver uses. Our noise-making dispositions have effects on how things go for us, as the shapes of beaver teeth affect how things go for them; our practices are evolutionarily useful. There is the same background picture for the beaver's teeth and for our noise making dispositions: the Darwinian picture of how organisms come to develop and maintain traits that are useful in their environment. Wittgenstein wants us to look at *picking up the teaching of series*, as something that our sort of being goes in for. We are able to grasp what the right way is to go on; but this isn't seen in terms of the usefulness – of what pays off – within the natural and social environment of a set of organisms. Wittgenstein's aim is a kind of self-recognition, a recognition of ourselves as beings with understanding, as for example in the way we do understand what to do to follow this or that rule. Seeing *our capacity to understand* naturalistically in this sense can then help us not to find the understanding *puzzling*, as we may do in philosophy, when we think of it as somehow determining in advance what we must do. Here then is where I want to end, with the contrast between Wittgenstein and Rorty in what naturalism comes to for them, and in how it hangs together with their totally different conceptions of their aims.

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