

# *Philosophical Investigations* §123: Waismann, Baker, Read and the Freedom View

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## Abstract

In this paper, I order the thinking of Friedrich Waismann, Gordon Baker, and Rupert Read into what I call the Freedom View (FV). I justify this labelling by demonstrating their inter-influence and evolving articulation of a shared framework that conceives the problems, aims, and method of (Wittgenstein's) philosophy to be defined by freedom. The Freedom View is one of the most consequential, yet frequently misunderstood, explications of the therapeutic aspects of Wittgenstein's later work. This interpretative labour enables an informed assessment of the merit of such a view. While the FV offers a coherent and provocative reading of Wittgenstein's philosophy, I argue, drawing on Heidegger's criticisms of Kant's conception of orientation, that it ultimately fails to capture the sense of ordinary orientation invoked by Wittgenstein in §123: "A philosophical problem has the form: 'I don't know my way about'". As such, the FV is partial and incomplete, unable to recognise a significant dimension to Wittgenstein's thought.

*A philosophical problem has the form: 'I don't know my way about' (PI: §123)*<sup>1</sup>

Responding to this remark, which occurs in Wittgenstein's most direct commentary on the nature of philosophy, is less a matter of believing in it than finding a way to integrate it as part of one's understanding of philosophy. Despite its conviction and deceptive simplicity, if initially, as seems likely, we are unable to find a way of going on with its characterisation of philosophical problems, then a disorientation occurs

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<sup>1</sup> I will refer to the *Philosophical Investigations* by section (PI: §) and number. Other Wittgenstein works are marked as follows: *Culture and Value* (CV), *Blue and Brown Books* (BBB), *Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics* (LFM), *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (TLP), and *Zettel* (Z).

that satisfies the conditions of that characterisation. There is a philosophical problem, but only if its account of philosophical problems is accepted. The remark threatens to become philosophically useless unless it is integrated into our assessment of philosophical problems.

One compelling response to the remark is to illuminate it by the therapeutic aspects of Wittgenstein's work, which may be thought of as attempts at removing conditions which impede orientation. It is now acknowledged that Wittgenstein's later philosophy includes aims best characterised as therapeutic. There is, however, no clear consensus on the emphasis to place on such aims, nor what an emphasis on them entails. The most emphatic therapeutic reading, and the focus of this paper, is the successive work of Friedrich Waismann, Gordon Baker, and Rupert Read. An important outcome of this paper is to order these thinkers into a coherent and provocative view which I label the 'Freedom View' (FV). This grouping is justified by detailing their interinfluence and evolving articulation of a shared framework which understands the problems, aims, and method of (Wittgenstein's) philosophy to be defined by freedom.

Far from an exercise of hagiography, this interpretative labour allows for an informed assessment of the merit of such a view. Drawing on Heidegger's critique of Kant's conception of orientation, I argue that the FV fails to grasp the notion of ordinary orientation that Wittgenstein invokes in §123. While §123 is not Wittgenstein's only remark on the genesis of philosophical problems, its first-personal form combined with the discomfort of disorientation make it particularly amenable to the FV.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, the fact that the FV cannot account for a crucial dimension of Wittgenstein's thought, one that is encapsulated in this remark and runs throughout the *Investigations*, renders the criticism especially damaging to the view.

The aims of the paper are therefore threefold: to establish and articulate the FV, the shared framework of an influential strand of therapeutic readings of the later Wittgenstein; to characterise the orientation Wittgenstein seeks in remark §123 as ordinary orientation; and to therefore show that the FV is partial and incomplete in its view of the later Wittgenstein because it leaves out of its understanding ordinary orientation.

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<sup>2</sup> This was pointed out to me by a reviewer.

## 1. Friedrich Waismann: vision in philosophy

The work of Friedrich Waismann is at the foundation of attempts at threading an interpretation of Wittgenstein through the notion of freedom. The core ideals of the FV, and the frame within which it has evolved, originate in the eponymous chapter of Waismann's posthumously collected *How I See Philosophy* (1968).

Pausing to reflect on the fitting title of his book helps guide our thought towards his work. 'How *I* see philosophy'. 'How I *see* philosophy'. This construction neatly captures Waismann's open-ended invitation to philosophical discussion and open-minded acceptance of alternative understandings of philosophy: "What philosophy is? I don't know, nor have I a set formula to offer" (1968: 1).

Thereafter, Waismann begins his sketch of the philosophical landscape via a contrast with science: "in philosophy there are no proofs; there are no theorems; and there are no questions which can be decided" (1968: p.1 see also PI: §109). Despite being less than precise in his characterisation of science, Waismann's central point is that philosophical arguments are not deductive. He couches this claim in the language of force: no matter how "forceful" a philosophical argument is, "it never forces" (1968: 29). He dryly challenges the reader to: "write down lists of propositions 'proved' by Plato or Kant" (1968: 2). This is not intended as a defect or denunciation of philosophy, though Waismann acknowledges that it will strike some as being one or the other. Instead, it is meant to motivate a recasting of the discipline's achievements and methods.

For Waismann, what philosophers are uniquely attuned to, and well positioned to contribute to an understanding of, are the wrinkles, confusions, and frictions in our conceptual understanding of the world. This means that philosophers are able to track the workings of our concepts as we use them in coming to understand ourselves and the world. Philosophy "senses as it were hidden crevices in the build of our concepts where others only see the smooth path of commonplaceness before them" (ibid). This unlocks both threats and promises. The threat is that under the influence of theoretical requirements to seek and construct theories and proofs, philosophers become entangled in confusion, seeking resolutions to 'unanswerable questions'. The promise is that philosophy, by reflecting on our language use, can either dissolve

such questions, which removes their hold over us, or a philosophical problem can “pass into science” (1968: 4-15).

An exemplary philosophical problem for Waismann is Augustine’s wonder at time and his subsequent investigation of the possibility of measuring time (an example that was also of interest to Wittgenstein, see PI: §§89-90 and BBB: 26). It demonstrates that the philosopher can render what seems to be most obvious and most known into a state of unease and puzzlement (see also CV: 17). These moments of wonder at the world are often experienced as perturbing because our philosophical questioning causes what was previously so obvious to become puzzling. The philosopher, “as he ponders over some such problem”, appears as one “who is deeply disquieted” (1968: 3). Such disquiet gives rise to a powerful wish to divert our attention away from these uncomfortable experiences or to produce theories which eradicate them.<sup>3</sup> Here, the first inklings of freedom as an integral notion arise. If this wonder generates an uneasiness of mind, and we must overcome the temptation to either avoid it or theorise against it, then there is space for a liberating release which resembles a kind of therapy and establishes a kind of freedom.

Waismann locates the source of Augustine’s philosophical puzzlement in “the opacities of speech” (1968: 6). Waismann’s emphasis on language as the cause of mystification quite obviously draws on the work of Wittgenstein, as does his claim that wrong analogies lead us to say things and ask questions that are confusions: “a wrong analogy absorbed into the forms of our language produces mental discomfort” (Waismann, 1968: 6; compare PI: §90). Different pictures of the workings of time lead to the puzzlement that instigates Augustine to ‘ask the unaskable’. It flows, but with no speed. It has a past and future, but we can only ever be in the uncatchable present. Waismann postulates that it is the noun form ‘*the time*’ which causes us to compulsively follow the discouraging and frustrating investigation that seeks to find what time *is*. Instead, Waismann prescribes, in the vein of §116, “don’t ask what time is but how the *word* ‘time’ is being used” (1968: 6).

Although we may experience wonder at any aspect of our lives, for Waismann it is *our* language that leads us to speak and ask questions in ways which lead to disquietude. Often in philosophy, we should refrain from answering questions and instead try to find a sense for those

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<sup>3</sup> A direction of thought that suggests an interesting comparison with Cora Diamond’s work on what she refers to as ‘difficulties of reality’ (2003).

questions (1968: 7). When we do this, we find that it is the question that is malfunctioning: “A philosophic question is not solved: *it dissolves*” (1968: 10). As for Wittgenstein, “philosophical problems should *completely* disappear.” (PI: §133). Wittgenstein also seeks philosophical peace, a state he characterises as philosophy no longer being “tormented by questions which bring *itself* in question” (ibid).

In Waismann’s picture of philosophy, we are released from our disquiet by being reminded of how our ordinary language works and a problem is unravelled when we become clear over how our use of concepts led us into it. This is where the philosopher’s skill of tracking the ‘wrinkles’ in our conceptual understanding uniquely qualifies them to grasp and dissolve these questions.

There is, however, an ambivalence in Waismann’s wrinkles metaphor that is not satisfactorily resolved within his view. The image can be understood in two different – potentially conflicting – ways, each corresponding to a different understanding of philosophy’s distinctive dissolving of problems.

On a ‘shallow’ reading, the wrinkles are forms of expression that are especially liable to cause confusion, but they do not reflect genuine contradictions or incoherence within our understanding of things. The shallow reading is suggested by Waismann’s repeated emphasis on confusions ‘about the use of language’. Here the philosopher’s role is conservative, it is to point out misunderstandings in how we use our words: “confusion [is] removed by calling to mind the use of language” (1968: 10).

Alternatively, on a ‘deep’ reading, the wrinkles reflect tensions or omissions in the very framework we use to make sense of the world. In this interpretation, philosophy is not merely a matter of conceptual clarification but of conceptual revision, not a return to our language but a gestalt switch in our worldview. This deep reading finds support in Waismann’s claim that philosophy dissolves all prejudices “no matter whether they have their origin in language or somewhere else” and in his insistence that it is essential for philosophy to “[break] through to a *deeper insight*” (1968: 21). This is when calling to mind uses of language is not enough to remove confusion. Instead, we require a transformation of our conceptual framework. Waismann describes these discoveries as being ‘found’ rather than sought (1968: 37). Descartes’ discovery of analytic geometry, Einstein’s discovery of a conceptual gap in the idea of

simultaneity, even Picasso's discovery of a new way of painting – for Waismann, these all represent discoveries that are the result of responding to wrinkles in our conceptual scheme, yet move beyond confusions about the use of language. This is why the core of a philosophy is an extension of vision, the ability to see “new aspects”, and “outgrowing preconceived notions” (ibid).

A potential response to this ambivalence, not articulated by Waismann, is that these different readings are connected to his different hopes of philosophy detailed above (either philosophical problems dissolve or pass into science). This would mean that what I have referred to as the shallow reading connects with the dissolving aim of philosophy, whereas the deep reading connects with the times when philosophical problems “go in for another career” and pass over to scientific problems (1968: 14). The philosopher, through the intensity of their study, “brings into the world” new questions, and these new questions might ultimately lead to new scientific discoveries. For example, Waismann points to Kant's questioning of how geometry is possible leading to later developments in our understanding of geometry (1968: 16-17).

Either way, liberation from confusion is only one dimension of freedom in Waismann's view. Another dimension concerns the methodology of doing philosophy. If philosophy looks to remind us of, and return us to, our everyday uses of language in order to dissolve problems, it cannot do this by bullying or forcing interlocutors into submission. “Language is not untouchable” – and people are free to use it how they want – even, Waismann claims, if this contravenes the ordinary sense given to the words (1968: 12). All philosophers can do is attempt to show ‘new aspects’ of our language use and “attempt to unfreeze habits of thinking, to replace them by less stiff and restricting ones” (1968: 34). In philosophy we describe grammar, offering no theories or explanations. Here, we can detect Waismann adopting the Wittgensteinian notions of grammar, the ordinary, and philosophical description.

Lastly, the final dimension of freedom is the freedom we gain in removing or dissolving philosophical problems. This is a ‘freedom of thought’ gained from losing our adherence to certain patterns of thought which restrict how we think, and cause disquietude and discomfort. This freedom is described metaphorically by Waismann as extending our *vision*:

What is characteristic of philosophy is the piercing of that dead crust of tradition and convention, the breaking of those fetters which bind us to inherited preconceptions, so as to attain a new and broader way of looking at things. (1968: 32)

This is an unfreezing of the mind, reminiscent of Wittgenstein's remark that "[w]orking in philosophy [...] is really more a working on oneself [...] On one's way of seeing things." (CV: 16).

Therefore, the framework articulated by Waismann, which goes on to organise the FV, has three aspects structured by the notion of freedom:<sup>4</sup> the problems of philosophy, the aims of philosophy, and the method of philosophy.

- i. Philosophy consists of loosening prejudices and undermining analogies that give a misleading impression of the functioning of our language.
- ii. This is achieved by extending *vision* and allowing new aspects of language to be drawn out, not by providing theorems or using deductive methods.
- iii. This philosophy works without any bullying and only with the free consent of the interlocutor.

It is these three aspects that are the content of Waismann's claim: "the essence of philosophy lies in its freedom" (1968: 21).

Waismann's relationship with Wittgenstein is multifaceted and entangled. Throughout the late 1920s and early 30s, Waismann had extensive conversations with Wittgenstein, and they considered publishing a book together.<sup>5</sup> Their relationship soured as they began unearthing disagreements, causing them to drift apart and abandon the project.<sup>6</sup> However, despite the overt efforts in *How I See Philosophy* to distance its views from Wittgenstein, there is undoubtedly a huge influence, especially the shift of the philosophical terrain to the grammar of our concepts.

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<sup>4</sup> This is a slight deviation from Katherine Morris' reflections on the framework of Waismann's views as containing two aspects structured by freedom (2019). However, this deviation doesn't take away from our more significant shared emphasis on freedom as an organising principle of Waismann's view.

<sup>5</sup> See *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations* for records of these conversations (Waismann 1979).

<sup>6</sup> See *The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle* for dictations from Waismann of conversations with Wittgenstein and also redrafted material whose source is the abandoned project *Logik, Sprache, Philosophie* (Waismann & Wittgenstein 2003).

Waismann's principal reasons for distancing himself from Wittgenstein derive from his misunderstanding that the therapeutic aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy are attempts to 'dissolve philosophy'. As a result, Waismann does not investigate the distortions that philosophers make and fails to appreciate Wittgenstein's criticisms of the metaphysician and metaphysical uses of language (PI: §116). An example of this is Waismann's obscure assessment of the metaphysicians as the "antennae of their time" (1968: 38). This assessment is connected to the second hope of philosophy mentioned above, whereby philosophical problems 'pass into science'. Waismann believed the philosopher's new vision of the conceptual landscape can be picked up and inherited by science in explaining the world (suggesting a deep reading of Waismann's wrinkle metaphor).

For example, Descartes' visionary philosophical work is celebrated by Waismann as prophetic and "a bold anticipation of what has been achieved in science at a much later date" (1968: 38). The greatest positive achievement of the philosopher is to produce vision that pushes forward scientific discourse: "The true successors of Descartes were those who translated the spirit of this philosophy into deeds, not Spinoza or Malebranche but Newton and the mathematical description of nature" (1968: 38).

Waismann's remarks here are suggestive rather than substantive. It is not clear either what the spirit of a philosophy is, or to what extent it can be picked up by science. His account also lacks Wittgenstein's sensitivity to everything that is involved in bringing "words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use" (PI: §116), a task that involves the need to diagnose the philosopher's distortions as well as foster a recognition and acceptance of the ordinary. I return to this point in my critique of the FV. Even so, what Waismann's remarks do show is a conception of philosophy as creative metaphysics, in which new ways of seeing are the central purpose – "the real thing" – and "everything else is subservient" (1968: 32). Assessing how closely this view aligns with Wittgenstein will depend on how one interprets his claim that "[t]he name 'philosophy' might also be given to what is possible *before* all new discoveries and inventions" (PI: §126), and whether this indicates a relationship with what follows from such discoveries, or a separation from them.



## 2. Gordon Baker: philosophy as therapy

Waismann's influence declined during the latter half of the 20th century, though this trend was partly reversed by the work of Gordon Baker. Later in his career, Baker embraced Waismann's conception of freedom as central to understanding the later Wittgenstein. As just noted, Waismann's complex relationship with Wittgenstein led him to distance himself from Wittgenstein's undeniable influence. In contrast, Baker developed the FV by adopting Waismann's framework and, with an emphasis on therapy, applying it as an interpretation of the *Philosophical Investigations*.

Although Baker introduced an emphasis on therapy as simply a continuation of Waismann's thought,<sup>7</sup> it is worth noting that Waismann had in fact distanced himself from the notions of 'therapy' and 'psychoanalysis' (see 1968: 92). While Peter Hacker's assessment that Waismann's work is "very far removed from the psychoanalytic model" (Hacker 2007: 96) is plainly exaggerated given Waismann's unequivocal focus on freedom, it should be Baker's name which is most intimately associated with the notion of therapy.

Baker's interpretation of Wittgenstein is driven by this question: how does freedom have anything to do with the study of our grammar? This can be contextualised as a response to his earlier views, jointly co-authored with Hacker in their authoritative two-volume commentary of the *Investigations*, which set out, in Baker's subsequent assessment of it, to interpret Wittgenstein's philosophy as marshalling the correct uses of words to clarify domains of grammar and dissolve philosophical problems.<sup>8</sup> Baker identifies a rupture in his understanding of the *Investigations*, caused by moving the notion of freedom towards the centre of his interpretation, a rupture exemplified by the sharply conflicting interpretations of Waismann's "How I See Philosophy" between Baker and Hacker.

If there is a correct use of grammar which can be comprehensively surveyed, as Baker's characterisation of his earlier collaborative view with Hacker of Wittgenstein would require, then there would be no latitude for

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<sup>7</sup> See Baker (2004: 181).

<sup>8</sup> See Baker (2004: 26). Also, see Hacker (2007) for a scathing and unsympathetic rejection of Baker's later views, and also Morris (2019) for an equally scathing response to the response. There is not space to rehearse or relitigate the disagreements between Baker and Hacker, it suffices to accept Baker's characterisation for simplicity and the purposes of explication. For their joint work, see Baker and Hacker (2005a, 2005b, and 2009).

the notion of freedom to co-exist within this depiction of a grammatical investigation. Freedom in this context would amount to little more than the liberty to speak gibberish: “Freedom? Why of course! You are perfectly **free** to talk **nonsense** if you wish.” (Baker 2004: 180).

Baker rejects this parody of therapeutic philosophy by dissolving the air of paradox that surrounds combining freedom and grammar. He believes that Wittgenstein’s method of grammatical analysis is a programme of enlarging freedom because its investigations are always concerned with responding to the way specific people use words and the specific problems or confusions they are encountering. This is their unconscious attachment to ‘pictures’, ‘ways of seeing’, ‘conceptions’, ‘ways of looking at or regarding things’, or ‘aspects’ that are non-exclusionary yet can be restricting, prejudicial, empty, and pernicious (2004: 266). The new method does not seek to marshal abstract, surveyable grammar, but rather to respond to the unconscious attachments which restrict freedom of thinking. By giving the individual new pictures, the method attempts to make their attachment to certain pictures manifest and thereby overcome their puzzlement by dissolving their attachment. This chimes with Wittgenstein’s remark in the *Investigations* on being held captive by pictures (§115), and it also reflects the possible dual meaning of §109: “Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language.” Language being both the source of our bewitchment and the resource we use in our struggle against it.

I will comment in more detail on two aspects of Baker’s view. Firstly, Baker’s view stresses that the individual is the locus of philosophical problems, and thus it is the freedom of individual thinkers that is strived for.

It is a method for treating thinkers and their troubles, not abstract problems, confusions or nonsense.

‘Our method’ gives individual treatment to individuals’ particular ‘problems’.

It is radically individualistic because it demands the active participation of the ‘patient’ in a discussion.  
(2004: 181)

From this stress on the individual, we can observe the importance of the comparison with psychoanalysis for Baker. His vision of philosophy

sharply contrasts with the common-sense idea that philosophy is the interplay and argumentative elaboration of different abstract positions, each of which is vying to achieve the status of a true or accepted philosophical theory. Or, as Baker describes it, the idea of the discipline as resolving disputes amongst various ‘isms’. Instead, for Baker, a philosophical problem is something which an individual has, and we should refrain from generalising about an individual’s position. A philosophical problem is something someone *suffers* from because they are captive within a philosophical prejudice (more on this in the next aspect), and thus our philosophical method is to try and alleviate this suffering. In dialogue, the individual interlocutor is engaged so that they must explain what they mean, how they want to use their words, how they see things. This gives them the responsibility to determine what the problem is and reveal the unacknowledged pictures operative in their thinking. The philosopher’s aim, in response, is to present the interlocutor with different pictures (or ways of seeing things) that overcome the confusion caused by attachment to certain pictures or ways of seeing things that are troubling them: “[t]he goal is to get these particular (quite specific) disturbances (disquiets) to disappear completely” (2004: 183, see PI: §133).

For example, Baker understands this to explain Wittgenstein’s remark that the Augustinian picture of language “surrounds the working of language with a haze which makes clear vision impossible” (PI: §5). The picture correlates the meaning of a word to the object that represents it and takes sentence meaning to be the combination of these words. Wittgenstein’s response to this picture is not to construct his own theory regarding meaning, i.e., a use theory of meaning. Instead, Baker understands Wittgenstein to respond with different pictures of our language use. This different ‘way of seeing’ or ‘aspect’ of the role of words offers a way for the interlocutor to think differently and undermine the hold of the Augustinian picture that was causing disquiet and making ‘clear vision impossible’. The new pictures shouldn’t be understood as theory-like generalisations – a picture that in one context is liberatory may become in a different context a picture we need freeing from. Such a view of Wittgenstein gains plausibility when we consider the qualification with which he introduces the idea of meaning as use: “For a *large* class of cases of the employment of the word “meaning” - though not for *all* - this word can be explained in this way: [...]” (PI: §43).

Unlike Waismann, there is no ‘dead crust of tradition’ or intellectual landscape which the philosopher is attempting to influence, only people and their problems. It is a view of philosophy as dialogue, not a debate. It is therapy, not theory. It is working on one’s own and others’ views with the strict goal of freedom. It is occasion-, context-, and problem-specific: “Every problem is *someone’s* problem, and another’s problem is *another* problem” (Baker 2004: 213). The obvious concern with this view, one explored in more detail in the next section, is that in charting a course away from understanding philosophical problems as abstract and unconnected to the lives of those who have them, Baker overemphasises the individual to such an extent that any shared sense of problems is excluded.

The second aspect I would like to highlight is Baker’s claim that Wittgenstein’s method is motivated by the discomfort and suffering caused by being trapped in philosophical confusion. Baker notes Wittgenstein’s phraseology to describe states of mind encountered in philosophy:

Unrest (PLP 7, 8), torment, disquiet (PI §111; LFM 33), discomfort (BBB 26; PLP 4), drives (PI §109), obsessions (HISP 18)<sup>9</sup>, craving (BBB 17; LFM 58), revulsion (BBB 15, 57), Angst (BBB 27; F 94), irritation (PLP 7; F 62), profound uneasiness of mind (HISP 3), profound mental discomfort (HISP 6), obsessional doubt (HISP 8), shock (PLP 7), troubles (BBB 46), compulsions to say things (BBB 47), irresistible temptations (BBB 18), alarm (HISP 4), etc. (Baker 2004: 182)

Baker believes this selection of words shows that for Wittgenstein there are a range of emotional and intellectual disturbances that his philosophical method is responsive to. Notwithstanding the serious worry that only two of these examples appear in the *Investigations*, whereas four originate from Waismann, it is these negative and restricting effects of being stuck within philosophical problems that Baker argues are the motivation for philosophical therapy.

The parallel with psychoanalysis is once again evident. In both cases, the aim is to dissolve patterns of thought that are restrictive, negative, or distorting. This cannot be accomplished through coercion or the imposition of a ready-made solution. Instead, it requires a process of gradual clarification in which the person troubled by these patterns is not

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<sup>9</sup> ‘HISP’ refers to Waismann (1968).

a passive recipient but an active participant. Just as in therapy, philosophical progress depends on the individual's willingness to examine their own assumptions, to entertain alternative perspectives, and ultimately to accept a transformation in how they see things. Without this consent and active engagement, the envisioned change in outlook cannot take hold.

Returning to our example of the Augustinian picture of language, for Baker, it is only acknowledging how the picture operates in our thought and by accepting an alternative picture that we can be liberated from it. Such freedom is the goal of Wittgenstein's philosophy for Baker (PI: §115).

Baker's stress on therapy is an evolving expression of the framework of freedom found in Waismann, and therefore makes it an expression of the FV. Firstly, Baker understands the problems of philosophy to be person-specific and conceptualised as restricting freedom. Secondly, freedom is the aim of Wittgenstein's philosophy, which aims at liberation from restricting pictures of the grammar of our words. Thirdly, freedom structures the method of the *Investigations*, which does not force us to accept something but presents alternative pictures that can help us see things differently.

### **3. Rupert Read: liberatory philosophy**

The last expression of the FV I will consider, which also explicitly inherits and navigates the framework found in Waismann and Baker, is found in Rupert Read's work and what he refers to as 'Wittgenstein's Liberatory Philosophy' (Read 2020). While Baker understood his work to be a defence and elucidation of Waismann's vision of philosophy, Read understands his own to be a defence and elucidation of Baker's (2020: xiv). As we will see, this means inheriting its emphasis on freedom while overcoming its individualism.

In contrast to Baker's estimations of Waismann, Read acknowledges the historical importance of Waismann while arguing that he was too scientific and overly optimistic about progress in philosophy (Read 2020: 3–4). Despite these shifting allegiances, it is still the case that Read rests his reading of Wittgenstein on freedom. The book's opening sentence declares: "the key to understanding Wittgenstein's later philosophy is to understand its *liberatory* purport" (2020: 1). Two emphases help define the nature of Read's articulation of the FV. Firstly, he is explicit in linking his

interpretation of the *Investigations* with an interpretation of the *Tractatus*. He understands his liberatory reading of the *Investigations* to be an extension of the resolute view of the *Tractatus*.<sup>10</sup> In contrast, Waismann makes no reference to the *Tractatus* in his vision of philosophy, while Baker sees the *Investigations* as correcting and overcoming the thought contained in *Tractatus*.<sup>11</sup> Baker even criticises the resolute reading of the *Tractatus* for being overly programmatic.<sup>12</sup>

Secondly, while Baker stresses the comparison to therapy, Read wants to move beyond therapy to the idea of liberation (2020: Ch.0.2). His justifications are mostly pragmatic rather than principled. Read is concerned that the notion of philosophical therapy tends to “elicit either a shrug or snarl”<sup>13</sup>, and that such resistance and failure to convince is a reason to reject therapy in favour of liberation. A liberatory philosophy more directly emphasises freedom, while also overcoming the reluctance associated with the previous nomenclature.

These two emphases guide Read’s liberatory ‘programme’ which ambitiously attempts to provide an interpretation of all the ‘important’ passages of the *Investigations*. Liberatory philosophy is a philosophy in which we are always working on ourselves, and in which this work on ourselves involves combatting our deep tendencies towards heteronomous thinking to generate greater autonomy. It aims to do this by removing unconscious pictures that limit our thinking and generate destructive patterns of thought (this part of the ‘programme’ is lifted from Baker). It is categorically not aimed at liberation from other people, but instead at realising our deep “enabling and desirable” dependence on other people (2020: 2). This latter emphasis distinguishes Read’s contribution to the FV. Read argues that Baker doesn’t fully extricate himself from the ‘egg-shells’ and ‘memories’ of the individualism of his earlier views. In contrast, liberatory philosophy is not individualistic but communal.

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<sup>10</sup> See Crary and Read (2000) for a range of essays concerning the resolute reading of the *Tractatus* and its connections to the *Philosophical Investigations*. The view is founded on taking Wittgenstein’s claim in the penultimate remark of the *Tractatus*, which refers to its own propositions as nonsense, resolutely – no “chickening out” as Cora Diamond’s put it, who was one of the originators of the view alongside James Conant (see TLP: 6.54; Diamond (1988); and Conant (1991)).

<sup>11</sup> Baker understands Wittgenstein’s remark §115 – “A picture held us captive” – to be autobiographical and alluding to his earlier view in the *Tractatus* (2004: 257, n.41).

<sup>12</sup> This is in an unfinished and unpublished essay shown to me by Katherine Morris.

<sup>13</sup> This phrase is from Katherine Morris’ endorsement of Read’s book.

Baker's 'individualism' responded to the conception of philosophical problems as abstract and disconnected from the people who have them, but, Read argues, Baker's response failed to consider other possibilities.

In leaping to the assumption that the alternative to centring one's philosophical attention on abstract positions must be centring it on the problems of individuals, Baker fails to be free, because he fails to see that there are other alternative possibilities (2020: xiv).

What are the other alternatives? Read strives to define liberatory philosophy as aiming at societal freedom, even going so far as to call Wittgenstein a "critic of ideology" (2020: 344–346). He argues that achieving liberation from misleading pictures and heteronomous thinking will tend to bring to attention our interdependence with other people, because many of these misleading pictures stem from our tendency to think of ourselves as separated or isolated. This is exemplified by Read's interpretation of Wittgenstein's thoughts on a private language. Read claims that part of what Wittgenstein attempts to allow us to overcome are illusions of our privateness from other people, illusions that permeate our culture (see 2020: Ch.10). In this way, the philosophical problem is not merely person-specific, but linked to how we conceive of our relationship to others.

Also, we do not achieve freedom individually, it is only within a community and with other people, speaking and philosophising together, that we do. Read connects this to Wittgenstein's insistence on "*our* method". This means, if we follow the liberatory programme, we become part of a movement that is ultimately responding to a "*society* that is 'ill', immature, resistant, captive" (2020: 12). Taken together, these elements steer Read's interpretation of Wittgenstein away from individualism, while preserving his commitment to the FV framework I have outlined. It also means Wittgenstein's philosophy is ethical and political, its technical arguments are subsumed within the aims of freeing oneself from delusions in a collective struggle. The method of Wittgenstein is both interactive and interpersonal.

Again, we can exemplify this interpretation by its discussion of Augustine's opening passage. Similar to Baker, Read believes that the passage from Augustine in §1 contains certain 'grammatical fictions'. These fictions are pictures of how things are – how we learned language and what language is for – which Wittgenstein's philosophy aims to liberate us from to achieve "autonomy from thought-constraining prejudice" (2020: 70). One of the grammatical fictions that Read perceives

is the idea that Augustine describes learning language as if he was already an adult (noted by Wittgenstein in PI: §32). From such a picture of language, the social dimension of its acquisition is obscured, giving rise to what Read describes as a “solipsistic hubris” (2020: 61). Part of Wittgenstein’s response, then, is aimed at restoring our sense of language learning as a practice that binds us to a community, rather than merely a process of coming to be able to articulate our already pre-existing desires.

Read also takes issue with Baker’s lack of acknowledgement for those aspects of Wittgenstein’s work that emphasise the shared nature of philosophical problems and the way in which philosophical entanglements are frequently cast in terms of a collective *us* (PI: §11, §63, §81, §115, etc.). The *Investigations* is alive to our shared linguistic practices and forms of life. Whereas Baker’s dictum, “every problem is *someone’s* problem, and another’s problem is *another* problem”, forecloses a broader perspective. It resists any perspective which doesn’t merely address each problem as an isolated, personal difficulty. It therefore fails to take account of the communal sources that may underlie multiple instances of confusion, arising precisely because of what is held in common by those who share a language, a culture, or a form of life.

Despite Read’s evolution of the tradition beyond the individual, the key to Wittgenstein’s philosophy remains the tripartite framework of freedom. The nature of philosophical problems, the aim of responding to philosophical problems, and the method used in doing so, are all understood by Read as connected to freedom, even though this freedom should no longer be understood as a freedom of the individual or freedom from other people.

#### **4. Kant, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein on orientation**

In this final section, I show that the FV, while provocative and internally coherent, offers only a partial and incomplete account of (Wittgenstein’s) philosophy. My approach is to return to the remark on the nature of philosophical problems quoted at the beginning of this paper. In reflecting on what it is to be orientated, I draw on Heidegger’s criticism of Kant to illuminate my own criticism of the FV. I demonstrate that the FV abstracts away from the ordinary orientation Wittgenstein is seeking to achieve in responding to philosophical problems. This is significant because, although §123 is not Wittgenstein’s sole comment on the nature of philosophical problems, it nonetheless reveals, as my concluding



example shows, an essential aspect of his work that any adequate interpretation must accommodate and understand. This is what I refer to as the text's attempt to 'reclaim the human'. This is not to deny that certain elements of Wittgenstein's philosophy are best described as seeking a kind of philosophical freedom, but rather to challenge the FV's emphasis on, and reading of, those aspects.

The remark claims that, for Wittgenstein, philosophical problems arise from a lack of orientation: "A philosophical problem has the form: 'I don't know my way about'" (PI: §123). Although this is initially to be understood as a lostness within language, Wittgenstein's reflections on language also concern our life with language, and the world that is revealed by our language: "And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life" (PI: §19). This is why, following Stephen Mulhall, we can describe this lack of orientation as an "individual's lostness to itself and its world" (2001: 217).

When do we say we don't know our way about? This can be because either the conditions for orientation have altered such that they no longer hold, or the conditions are yet to be established. For example, even when we find ourselves somewhere familiar, our living room, our navigating abilities may be inhibited by an untimely power cut or the amount of alcohol we've consumed. Similarly, in a city otherwise familiar to us, we may find ourselves unable to know our way about. This may be because of the introduction of a complicated one-way system, or the rapidity with which the progress of time is changing the shape, feel or make up of the place. Equally, you may find yourself unable to navigate around a complicated world issue because an event breaks your framing understanding. There could be an eruption of violence in a situation you had previously understood as peaceful and stable. In such situations, we find ourselves not knowing our way about because the conditions we relied on no longer hold.

Alternatively, we may be somewhere completely new, for better or for worse, and be asked for directions: "Sorry, I don't know my way about". We may not know our way about a topic or a particularly thorny issue because we don't understand, or claim to have a grasp on, the important distinctions and factors, or we just can't make head nor tail of it. In these cases, we have yet to establish the conditions for knowing our way about and are ungrounded.

If a philosophical problem has the form indicated in §123, then we must consider which of these senses of disorientation Wittgenstein is referring to, and therefore what it will require to regain our orientation. This can be considered alongside another of Wittgenstein's remarks on philosophy: "What *we* do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use" (PI: §116). If we understand our uses of words to be connected to our life, then not only do we have to return our words from their misuse in philosophy, which has caused disorientation, but also to return our lives to a state in which we are no longer either lost to ourselves or in disagreement with ourselves.<sup>14</sup> It is from an experience of, and attentiveness to, disorientation that we may come to know, through what we have lost, what it is to be orientated. Only then may we take on the task of finding and recovering ourselves.

This means that for Wittgenstein there is always a contrast between, and a transition from, *dis*-orientation to a state of orientation, and therefore even if we become disorientated there is always an everyday use of our words to return to from which to establish the conditions for re-orientation. The conditions for orientation have been lost rather than yet to be established. In response, by reclaiming and returning to the everyday use of language you are provided with the conditions from which to *re*-orientate yourself.

In his essay, "What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thought?" (1991: Ch.12), Kant begins his discussion of the conditions of orientation by considering what is needed to orientate ourselves within physical space. He considers attempting to position himself with regard to the sun in the sky at midday, using his surroundings to navigate by figuring out the points of the compass as they relate to where he is. Despite all the 'objective data' he can acquire from his surroundings, the details that make up the position and relative location of the things around him, Kant argues that he will be unable to orientate himself without an essential 'subjective distinction'. This is a distinction which one *feels* orientates oneself with regard to this objective data. Kant asserts that he must feel the difference between his left and right sides to enable him to orientate himself within the situation. This subjective distinction creates the

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<sup>14</sup> As detailed by Cavell (1988: 254): "the behaviour of words is not something separate from our lives, those of us who are native to them, in mastery of them. The lives themselves have to return."

conditions to situate himself amongst the objective data. This is referred to by Kant as “geographical orientation” (1991: 238–239).

Kant extends the concept to “mathematical orientation”, which is “any kind of orientation within a given space”, by considering the example of finding himself disorientated in a room familiar to him because it is completely dark (1991: 238). In this situation, he lacks the objective data to situate himself because the conditions for orientation have been removed. It is only by stumbling around and blindly feeling for a familiar aspect of the room, say the front of a desk, that he can establish his way around. This is because this familiar aspect allows him to build up a picture of the space from which to orientate himself. Essential for Kant is that this again indicates that a subjective distinction is required from which orientation is possible. An aspect of his body interacts with some object in the room, and it is from that interaction that he can become aware of his position within the room and can orientate himself within it.

Heidegger was dissatisfied with Kant’s picture of the conditions for orientation, which constructs the concept as based solely on the presence of a subjective distinction within the objective data. For Heidegger, being lost is not only about how someone might not be able to position themselves through a subjective distinction with regard to the objects that make up their surroundings, but must also be characterised as someone’s losing a sense of their place in the world. For Heidegger, I necessarily orient myself both in and from my being already alongside a world which is ‘familiar’ (1962: 144). We are orientated in the world because we have familiarity with it; ordinarily, we know where we are going, how things fit together, and how to act.

This aspect of orientation is present within Kant’s descriptions, although seemingly marginalised. In Kant’s description of the process of orientation within the dark room, we not only rely on the subjective distinction between our left and right sides for orientation, but the fact that the object that we encounter is one we are *familiar* with. Heidegger’s response to this is to argue that if we want to know what ordinarily being orientated is, we must characterise our familiarity with the world and not just the abstract ‘subjective distinction’ which is “restricted beforehand to a worldless subject” (Heidegger 1962: 144).

To characterise our familiarity with the world, Heidegger argues that we require a conception of the further sense of feeling at home in a situation. Just as we are naturally orientated within our living room not

only because of the subjective distinction between our left and right side, which allows us to generate a geographical or mathematical picture of the space, but also because we have a familiarity with it. This includes knowledge of how the different objects within the room relate to each other and how to navigate around them. We are orientated within the room with regard to the distance we have to lean to reach the coffee table to pick up our cup of tea, or the best way to turn the lights off as we leave the room to go to bed. The fact that this aspect of our ordinary orientation is one “we constantly make use” of does not exempt us from providing a suitable explication of it (*ibid.*). That this aspect appears in Kant’s description shows, for Heidegger, that we can’t suppress it, even if Kant doesn’t satisfactorily explore it.

Kant investigates the “conditions of possibility for orientation, rather than how we become orientated in given situations”, or, rather than our ordinary orientation (Ahmed 2004: 6). Returning to Wittgenstein’s remark on philosophical disorientation, there is evidence that Wittgenstein intends to refer to the ‘Heideggerian’ ordinary aspects of orientation when he claims that philosophical problems are a form of disorientation.

One must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language in which it is at home [in der Sprache, in der es seine Heimat hat]?  
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What *we* do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. (PI: §116)

For Wittgenstein, when I don’t know my way about, I suffer a loss of orientation within language, whereby speaking outside of our language-games we take the word out of its home.<sup>15</sup> To bring our words back to their everyday use is to situate them in their home, and this is not merely to overcome the disorientation of being situated in a philosophical problem by being liberated from certain pictures, but to reclaim our familiarity with our words and the world which we make sense of with our words.

To overcome disorientation, Wittgenstein sets out to describe our ‘customs’, ‘practices’, ‘usages’, and ‘institutions’ with words, which all make up the phenomena of our life (PI: §7, §197, §199, §202, §337, §380, §584). For example, “The concept of pain is characterized by its particular function in our life [...]. Pain has this position in our life; has these

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<sup>15</sup> See also Mulhall (1994: 158).

connections” (Z: §§532–33). Or, “[a]n intention is embedded in a setting, in human customs and institutions” (PI: §337). In reminding us of these phenomena, Wittgenstein’s philosophy is an exercise which attempts to re-orientate us away from our lostness with and to our words. His investigations recover and reclaim our words and reveal their position within the customs and usages which make up our life.

This sense of return and ordinary orientation is unrecognisable from within the FV. The FV understands the sole aim of Wittgenstein’s work to be the liberation from misleading pictures or ways of seeing things. This means that for the FV, the depth of Wittgenstein’s concern with these topics is the depth of his attempts to liberate us from misleading pictures. However, if we understand Wittgenstein’s goal as ordinary orientation to our words as a way of inhabiting those words, then this must necessarily go beyond the FV. In combatting philosophical prejudice Wittgenstein provides insights into the workings of our language, but this should be appreciated alongside the way in which his combatting of theoretical attitudes which undermine and distort our life with language means that “these workings are recognised” as our own (§109).

This critique of the FV parallels Heidegger’s critique of Kant – the FV is only able to conceptualise Wittgenstein’s work as responsive to the ‘conditions of possibility for orientation’, whereas the deeper, ethical, heart of the book is the way it can recover and reclaim our ordinary orientation. Wittgenstein’s work is not limited to freedom but can also:

Discover and reveal the all but unimaginable richness, texture, flexibility, and power of our ordinary language and forms of life. It allows us, that is, to appreciate our home, the ground on which we walk. (Affeldt 2013: 21)

A more complete interpretation of Wittgenstein must recognise the *Investigations*’ attempts to reclaim aspects of our ordinary language and life that are distorted, undermined, or ignored by philosophy. I call these attempts, following the work of Stanley Cavell, the “reclaiming of the human”.

I end with an example of these attempts, a short but representative example of Wittgenstein’s struggles for ordinary orientation and description of our human life with language. It concerns Wittgenstein’s discussion of grief, love, and hope.

What is a *deep* feeling? Could someone have a feeling of ardent love or hope for one second — *no matter what* preceded or followed this second? — What is happening now has significance—in these surroundings. The surroundings give it its importance. And the word "hope" refers to a phenomenon of human life. (A smiling mouth *smiles* only in a human face.) (PI: §583)

“Grief” describes a pattern which recurs, with different variations, in the tapestry of life. (PI: PPF i §2)

“For a second he felt violent pain.” — Why does it sound odd to say: “For a second he felt deep grief”? Only because it so seldom happens? (PI: PPF i §3)

Wittgenstein investigates our language and concepts within their role in the ‘tapestry’ or ‘phenomenon’ of life, and is concerned about investigations which rely on, or seek to, extract language and our concepts from this context. This means that Wittgenstein investigates grammar by reflecting on our involvement with language and words, the context of our life which allows us to recognise and recall their application. Grief, love and hope are specific patterns in our life, connected to particular customs and usages, and so in responding to Wittgenstein’s questions on the nature of these concepts, we rely on what they are *for us* in our human lives. This is why Wittgenstein depicts his philosophy as a return. It can return us to our language, reclaim our orientation with our words, and remove the myriad ways such orientation may be distorted or undermined by the requirements and assumptions we bring to philosophising. Requirements and assumptions that cause us to talk and use words outside their meaningful language-games.

Wittgenstein’s probing investigations ask us to imaginatively draw on our life with language. Wittgenstein is highlighting the fact that for us, with our concept, and in ordinary circumstances, someone cannot feel grief, ardent love, or hope for one second. This is about the words “grief”, “love”, and “hope”, but, crucially, also about what grief, ardent love, and hope are. The fact that we cannot feel such things for one second, or at least it would require elaborate and specific reasons why we could, is not because such occurrences are rare, or because they are empirically impossible, but because they would not be what we call grief, love, or hope. Just like, “If a man’s bodily expression of sorrow and of joy alternated, say with the ticking of a clock, here we would not have the characteristic course of the pattern of sorrow or of the pattern of joy” (PI: PPF i §2) When ruling out the possibilities “we might say: given our world

this cannot happen; it is not, in our language, what ['grief', 'ardent love', 'hope'] mean; necessary in our world that this is not what [grief...] are" (Cavell 2002: 85 n.9).

The FV seems compelled to understand Wittgenstein's comments on grief, love and hope as providing merely new pictures of these phenomena, detailing new aspects of their use or new ways of seeing things, which are introduced to counteract previously restrictive ways of seeing. This cannot capture how Wittgenstein's comments reveal part of what grief, love, and hope are, *for us*, by reminding us of their grammar. This does not deny that aspects of Wittgenstein's work are concerned with freedom. Rather, it rejects the overriding emphasis on these aspects, which within the framework of freedom endorsed by the FV, serves to undermine and overlook other essential aspects.

Although the example I have introduced concerns specific concepts, the philosophical dynamic of reclaiming orientation can be applied more generally to the *Investigations* and its roaming inquiry into our language and life with language. In its response to the Augustinian picture of language, remarks on rule-following, and investigation of a private language, we can see the philosophical struggle as not only an attempt to free us from philosophical confusion but also to return and reclaim our ordinary orientation with our language. It is imperative we strive to accommodate and understand this aspect of Wittgenstein's task.

## 5. Conclusion

In this paper, I have introduced and characterised the Freedom View. This is the evolving working through of the notion of freedom by Waismann, Baker, and Read, and results in a coherent and provocative understanding of the problems, aims, and method of (Wittgenstein's) philosophy. I then went on to undermine the view's emphasis, and interpretation of Wittgenstein, by finding an alternative way of going on with Wittgenstein's claim about philosophical problems in remark §123. I argued that the FV can only give us the conditions of possibility for orientation rather than what it is actually like to be ordinarily orientated. This led to a discussion of what a view that took seriously the idea of orientation would look like and suggested the idea of Wittgenstein's

philosophy as reclaiming the human. The task that remains is to define and articulate such a view more fully.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> I am very grateful to the editors and the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and probing suggestions.



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