Moore(anists) and Wittgenstein on Radical Skepticism

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Nicola Claudio Salvatore

Abstract

In this paper, I present and criticize a number of influential contemporary anti-skeptical strategies inspired by G.E. Moore’s “proof of an external world”. I argue that these accounts cannot represent a valid response to skeptical worries. Furthermore, drawing on Wittgenstein’s criticisms of Moore, I argue that Radical skeptical hypotheses should be considered nonsensical combinations of signs, excluded from our epistemic practices.

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How to Cite
SALVATORE, Nicola Claudio. Moore(anists) and Wittgenstein on Radical Skepticism. Nordic Wittgenstein Review, [S.l.], p. 153-182, dec. 2016. ISSN 2242-248X. Available at: <http://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3392>. Date accessed: 25 mar. 2017.
Keywords
hinges; knowledge; radical skepticism; Moore G. E.; Wittgenstein Ludwig
Section
Section i: Articles